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Sexuality and Incapacity 
ALEXANDER A. BONI-SAENZ* 
Sexual incapacity doctrines are perhaps the most important form of 
sexual regulation, as they control access to sex by designating who is 
legally capable of sexual consent. Most states have adopted sexual 
incapacity tests for adults that focus narrowly on assessing an 
individual’s cognitive abilities. These tests serve an important 
protective function for people with temporary cognitive impairments, 
such as those rendered incapable due to alcohol or drugs. However, 
this comes at the cost of barring many people with persistent cognitive 
impairments, such as Down Syndrome or Alzheimer’s Disease, from 
any sexual activity. This is despite the fact that said individuals often 
still have sexual desires and are able to engage in sexual decision-
making with support from caregiving networks. The central claim of 
this Article is that sexual incapacity doctrine should grant legal 
capacity to adults with persistent cognitive impairments if they are 
embedded in an adequate decision-making support network. In other 
words, the right to sexual expression should not be withheld due to 
cognitive impairment alone. To justify this claim, the Article provides 
a theory of sexual incapacity doctrine that is grounded in the practice 
of supported decision-making and the normative foundations of sexual 
capability and relational autonomy. The Article then sets forth a novel 
test for sexual consent capacity: cognition-plus. This test focuses on 
gauging the capacity for volition, assessing the mental capacity of the 
individual to understand the nature and consequences of the sexual 
decision, and evaluating the adequacy of the decision-making support 
system using principles of fiduciary law. The Article concludes by 
applying the cognition-plus test to the case of older adults with 
dementia, a group of increasing importance with the aging of the 
population. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Henry Rayhons and Donna Young did not expect to find love again after 
being widowed.1 They met in their late 60s, and first flirted in church while 
singing for the choir. Two years later, they were getting married in front of 
over 350 guests. Now in their 70s, they enjoyed several activities together, 
such as beekeeping, farming, and long leisurely drives. They also had sex.2 In 
2010, Donna was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease. As her condition 
worsened, two of her daughters from a previous marriage moved her to a 
residential care facility. Henry would regularly visit her, and on one visit in 
May 2014, Donna’s roommate thought she heard sexual noises coming from 
across the privacy curtain in their shared room. This led Donna’s daughters to 
seek guardianship over Donna and to limit Henry’s interactions with her. On 
August 8, 2014, Donna passed away. A week later, Henry was arrested and 
charged with felony sexual abuse on the basis that Donna Rayhons suffered a 
                                                                                                                     
 1 This narrative is adapted from Bryan Gruley, Rape Case Asks if Wife with 
Dementia Can Say Yes to Her Husband, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/rape-case-asks-if-wife-with-dementia-
can-say-yes-to-her-husband [http://perma.cc/S7SZ-LPJ4]. 
 2 Id. (“‘It was not a regular thing,’ Rayhons told the agent. At his age, he said, ‘you 
forget about that stuff and you just want togetherness.’ He said Donna on occasion asked 
for sex by saying, ‘Shall we play a little bit?’ He said he ‘never touched her when she 
didn’t want it and I only tried to fulfill her need when she asked for it.’”). 
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“mental defect” that made her unable to consent.3 Henry abandoned his run for 
another term as a state legislator, and the criminal case garnered national 
media attention.4 A week-long trial exposed details of Donna and Henry’s 
relationship, Donna’s medical condition, and their alleged sexual encounter in 
May. After two days of deliberations, the jury acquitted Henry of 
wrongdoing.5 
Henry and Donna’s romance highlights how important sexuality can be to 
human flourishing, even in later life.6 It can bring pleasure and meaning, and 
can serve as a basis for identity and social relationships.7 The criminal charges 
against Henry show how the law can be used to regulate these relationships 
and sexuality. The sexual incapacity doctrines that were at play in that case are 
perhaps the most important form of sexual regulation, as they control access to 
sex by designating who is legally capable of sexual consent.8 When someone 
is deemed to lack legal capacity, the law imposes civil and criminal liability on 
sexual partners for battery and rape.9 In addition, it triggers vicarious liability 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See Complaint & Affidavit at 1, State v. Rayhons, No. 02411 FECR010718  
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dps.state.ia.us/commis/pib/Releases/2014/ 
Rayhons_Complaint_&_Affidavit.pdf [http://perma.cc/93RR-XK2Q]. 
 4 See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Sex, Dementia and a Husband on Trial at Age 78,  
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/health/sex- 
dementia-and-a-husband-henry-rayhons-on-trial-at-age-78.html [http://perma.cc/WQ2T-
7HZT]; Sarah Kaplan, In an Iowa Courtroom, an Astonishing Case of Sex and Alzheimer’s, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/ 
2015/04/07/in-an-iowa-courtroom-an-astonishing-case-of-sex-and-alzheimers/ [http://perma.cc/ 
4NEU-JLEU]. 
 5 See Tony Leys & Grant Rodgers, Rayhons: ‘Truth Finally Came Out’ with Not 
Guilty Verdict, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/ 
story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/04/22/henry-rayhons-acquitted-sexual-abuse/26105699/ 
[http://perma.cc/56J4-LKX7]. 
 6 See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1958 (2000) (“Sexuality 
and reproduction are a part of life, for example, as are disability and aging.”). 
 7 See GARETH MOORE, THE BODY IN CONTEXT: SEX AND CATHOLICISM 64–69 (2001) 
(arguing from a Catholic standpoint for the value of sexual pleasure); Gowri 
Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 371, 386 (2013) (“Who one has sex with often signifies something important about 
one’s social identity. It communicates what one finds desirable, who one is desirable to, 
even sometimes what one thinks about gender, domestic labor, and children.”); Carole S. 
Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 
38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289, 316 (1993) (arguing that an understanding of sexuality must 
include an analysis of pleasure). Its absence, however, can cause loss, grief, and 
deterioration in health. See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, To Be or to Exist: Standards for 
Deciding Whether Dementia Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex, 
and Adultery, 42 IND. L. REV. 675, 681–82 (2009) (discussing the negative effects of the 
absence of close relationships). 
 8 See PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 34–39 (2004) (describing capacity as a 
minimum requirement of consent). 
 9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (noting that 
for consent to be valid as a defense to battery the person must have the capacity for 
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and regulatory consequences for institutions that are responsible for 
safeguarding those with cognitive impairments.10 The threat of this liability 
often leads institutions to establish highly restrictive sexual environments, 
especially in response to family member requests.11 
Sexual incapacity doctrines, however, shape more than just older adult 
sexuality. They have a wide reach, affecting sexually precocious minors, 
intoxicated teenagers on college campuses, and younger adults with Down 
Syndrome as well.12 Most states have adopted incapacity tests for adults that 
focus narrowly on assessing an individual’s cognitive abilities.13 These tests 
serve an important protective function for individuals with temporary and 
transient incapacity, such as those rendered incapable due to alcohol or 
drugs.14 However, this comes at the cost of barring many people with 
persistent forms of incapacity from any sexual activity.15 This is despite the 
                                                                                                                     
consent); 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 282 (15th ed. 1995) 
(describing incapacity as vitiating consent in the context of rape). 
 10 See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis 
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 
563 (1988) (“‘Vicarious liability’ may be defined as the imposition of liability upon one 
party for a wrong committed by another party.”); Elizabeth Hill, Note, We’ll Always Have 
Shady Pines: Surrogate Decision-Making Tools for Preserving Sexual Autonomy in Elderly 
Nursing Home Residents, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 479 (2014) (discussing the 
regulatory consequences in the context of nursing homes). 
 11 See Daniel Engber, Naughty Nursing Homes: Is It Time to Let the Elderly Have 
More Sex?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_sex_issue/ 
2007/09/naughty_nursing_homes.html [http://perma.cc/JJ2M-P8WG] (“Why are nursing-
home administrators so queasy about sexual expression? They’re afraid of getting sued.”). 
There is a notable exception to this trend. See Bryan Gruley, Boomer Sex with  
Dementia Foreshadowed in Nursing Home, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-22/boomer-sex-with-dementia-foreshadowed-
in-nursing-home [http://perma.cc/4RKJ-HVYA] (discussing the sex-positive policies of 
Hebrew Home in New York). 
 12 See State v. McCurdy, No. 13-0460, 2014 WL 467916, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 
2014) (minors); Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) 
(Down Syndrome); Amanda Hess, How Drunk Is Too Drunk to Have Sex?,  
SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2015/02/ 
drunk_sex_on_campus_universities_are_struggling_to_determine_when_intoxicated.html 
[http://perma.cc/2WWG-DYCM] (students on college campuses).  
 13 See, e.g., Melton v. State, 639 S.E.2d 411, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the 
victim could not “understand the consequences of her actions, including sexual acts”); Durr 
v. State, 493 S.E.2d 210, 212–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasizing the victim’s weak 
memory capacity and the inability to relate cause and effect). 
 14 See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for 
Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 186 (2002) (discussing how the incapacity test helps 
“protect and vindicate the right of all citizens to be free of nonconsensual sexual 
exploitation”). 
 15 See Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 315, 324 (“In nearly all institutions, such a high consent standard can totally prohibit 
sexual relations among residents.”). 
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fact that said individuals often still have sexual desires and are able to engage 
in sexual decision-making with support from caregiving networks.16 By 
applying a test that focuses narrowly on cognitive abilities to individuals with 
persistent impairments, courts are unnecessarily and permanently restricting 
the sexual expression of millions of individuals, with intensely negative social, 
psychological, and health consequences. 
The central claim of this Article is that sexual incapacity doctrine should 
grant legal capacity to adults with cognitive impairments if they are embedded 
in an adequate decision-making support network. In other words, the right to 
sexual expression should not be withheld due to cognitive impairment alone. 
To justify this claim, it provides a theory of sexual incapacity doctrine that is 
normatively grounded in sexual capability—a concept derived from the 
capabilities approach in economics and moral philosophy.17 Sexual capability 
is the opportunity to achieve certain states of being or perform certain 
activities associated with sexuality, such as experiencing sexual pleasure or 
forming a sexual identity.18 An individual’s sexual capability is a product not 
only of that person’s cognitive abilities, but also of her social resources and the 
legal treatment of those abilities and resources. For people with persistent 
cognitive impairments, those resources often include a decision-making 
support network composed of a single caregiver, a set of family members, or 
an institution’s staff. These supportive networks highlight the relational nature 
of autonomy in the lived experience of people with persistent cognitive 
impairments.19 
With this normative understanding, the Article sets forth a novel sexual 
consent capacity test for this population: cognition-plus.20 It derives its name 
from a joint focus on the mental capacities of the subject (cognition) and the 
recognition that some individuals achieve sexual decision-making capacity 
through the assistance of a decision-making support network (plus). The test 
proceeds in three general steps. The first step is to gauge whether the 
individual has the threshold capacity to express volition with respect to a 
sexual decision. Without this manifestation of desire, one cannot proceed to be 
a sexual agent. If the first step is satisfied, the second step is to assess whether 
the individual has the necessary mental capacities to understand and reason 
about the nature and consequences of a given sexual decision. If one meets this 
requirement, then one has sexual consent capacity without the need for 
assistance. 
If one does not meet that requirement, however, the third step is to 
evaluate whether there is an adequate decision-making support network in 
place. These networks can provide support to an individual in formulating her 
                                                                                                                     
 16 Id. at 324–30. 
 17 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). 
 18 See infra Part III.A. 
 19 See infra Part III.B. 
 20 See infra Part IV.A. 
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purposes, connecting her desires with options, communicating with others, and 
creating a safe space to engage in sexual expression. Assessment of the system 
would be contextual in nature, guided by the principles of loyalty and care 
from fiduciary law. Thus, courts would evaluate whether the system is free 
from conflicts of interest, has adequate knowledge of the individual and the 
sexual decision, and has taken reasonable steps to protect the individual with 
cognitive impairments from the threat of sexually transmitted diseases and 
pregnancy. If the system is adequate, then the individual possesses sexual 
consent capacity. 
The Article concludes by applying the cognition-plus test to the specific 
case of older adults with dementia.21 This population has received scant 
attention in the legal literature, even though it is a group of increasing 
importance with the aging of the population.22 The cognition-plus test would 
facilitate sexual expression among older adults with dementia by removing an 
unnecessary threat of liability from nursing homes and assisted living 
facilities, provided they supply an adequate supported decision-making 
environment. At the same time, it maintains the protective nature of sexual 
incapacity doctrines for those with persistent cognitive impairments. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides the background for 
understanding adult sexual incapacity doctrines. It defines key concepts, 
presents a taxonomy of incapacity, reviews how doctrines exert regulatory 
control over sexual life, and examines the weaknesses with existing doctrinal 
approaches. Part III argues for sexual capability as the normative basis of 
sexual incapacity doctrine and introduces the emerging concept and practice of 
supported decision-making, a manifestation of relational autonomy. Part IV 
outlines the key features of the cognition-plus test for sexual consent capacity 
and applies it to the case of older adults with dementia. 
II. SEXUALITY AND INCAPACITY 
This Part provides the background for understanding the sexual incapacity 
doctrine, its effects, and the contexts in which it is applied. Part A defines the 
key terms of sexuality and incapacity. It also introduces a taxonomy of the 
four contexts of incapacity, which are differentiated primarily by their 
temporal scopes. Part B examines how the law in this area exerts regulatory 
power through its imposition of liability on sexual partners and through its part 
in creating and reinforcing social norms. Part C reviews existing doctrinal and 
scholarly tests of sexual incapacity and their weaknesses. 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See infra Part IV.B. 
 22 See Liesi E. Hebert et al., Alzheimer Disease in the US Population: Prevalence 
Estimates Using the 2000 Census, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1119, 1120 (2003) 
(projecting that the number of people with Alzheimer’s Disease will increase to 13.2 
million by 2050). 
2015] SEXUALITY AND INCAPACITY 1207 
A. Definitions 
In this Article, I adopt a broad definition of sexuality, encompassing the 
variety of desires, practices, identities, and relationships deemed sexual by an 
individual.23 Thus, it includes the desire for sexual pleasure and the objects 
towards whom it is directed or not directed.24 It also encompasses practices 
deemed sexual, including everything from holding hands and flirting to 
stimulation of the genitals, “kinky sex,” and a host of other practices.25 These 
sexual practices, in turn, may help to form one’s identity, which could be 
based on one’s objects of desire (e.g., heterosexual), one’s sexual proclivities 
(e.g., dominatrix), or one’s method of sociosexual interaction (e.g., “ladies 
man”).26 Finally, these desires, practices, and identities are social in nature, as 
other people are often the targets of desire, the participants in sexual activities, 
or members of shared sexual communities.27 This definition is capacious, with 
the goal of being inclusive of the many forms sexuality takes.28 
Sexuality is also important.29 It represents a unique source of pleasure, 
meaning, and social connection.30 The Supreme Court has recognized a sexual 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 219 (1988) (defining sexuality as “in its 
broadest sense to refer to the full range of intimate connectedness that we might 
experience, including, but not limited to, sexual love or ‘eros.’”). My definition embraces 
the notion that sexuality is defined in part by a given social context in which an individual 
is situated. See JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY 7 (Routledge 2d ed. 2003) (1986) (claiming 
that “what we define as ‘sexuality’ is a historical construction, which brings together a host 
of different biological and mental possibilities, and cultural forms—gender identity, bodily 
differences, reproductive capacities, needs, desires, fantasies, erotic practices, institutions 
and values—which need not be linked together, and in other cultures have not been”). 
 24 See IGOR PRIMORATZ, ETHICS AND SEX 46 (1999) (defining sexual desire as the 
“desire for certain bodily pleasures”); Alan H. Goldman, Plain Sex, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
267, 268 (1977) (defining sexual desire as “desire for contact with another person’s body 
and for the pleasure which such contact produces”). 
 25 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1504 (2012) 
(discussing the importance of considering all sexual practices, “mainstream or outlandish, 
common or unusual, quotidian or kinky, normal or deviant”). 
 26 See Ramachandran, supra note 7, at 386. 
 27 See, e.g., JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 23–39 (1983) 
(tracing the creation of an urban gay subculture after World War II).  
 28 It also reflects the reality that defining sex, a core facet of sexuality, is exceedingly 
difficult. Philosophers of sexuality have debated this conceptual-definitional question at 
length, with some claiming that no satisfying definition of sex is readily available. See 
RAJA HALWANI, PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 123–30 (2010) (discussing 
how specifications of sex fail through counterexample). 
 29 The degree of importance will vary across the population, with asexuals perhaps 
finding it less important than most due to the lack of sexual attraction they experience. See 
generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 316 (2014) 
(“[C]ontemporary asexuality is generally defined by two related ideas: lack of sexual 
attraction and lack of choice.”). The relatively capacious definition of sexuality used in this 
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liberty interest in Lawrence v. Texas, though its dimensions are actively 
debated by scholars.31 Other areas related to sexuality have also received 
constitutional protection. Marriage, which is the social institutionalization of a 
form of sexuality, has been deemed fundamental by the Court.32 The Court has 
also closely guarded the related principle of bodily integrity, though the 
constitutional justifications for this principle vary.33 Whatever the contours of 
a right to sexual expression might be, the degree to which it extends to people 
who have cognitive impairments remains unexplored.34 
Capacity and incapacity are functional concepts. This means that 
incapacity is assessed with respect to the ability to make a particular decision, 
                                                                                                                     
Article would still be inclusive of the asexual experience, even if the legal implications of 
sexual contact that are explored here might not be as relevant for that population.  
 30 See PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE: THOUGHTS ON 
THE NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 8–10 (rev. ed. 2002) (discussing the neurobiology of 
sexual pleasure); Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 282–83 (2008) (describing the value of sex to women in 
particular). 
 31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The literature on the meaning of 
Lawrence is voluminous. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian 
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (arguing that Lawrence 
stands for a broad liberty-based sexual entitlement); Katherine M. Franke, The 
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) 
(arguing the sexual right does not extend beyond the bedroom); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty 
After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1060 (2004) (arguing that the scope of Lawrence’s 
liberty interest is primarily constrained by consideration of third-party interests). 
 32 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“Over time and in other 
contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due 
Process Clause.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing marriage as 
“fundamental to our very existence and survival”). Some scholars, however, remain 
skeptical that the right to marry is more than a minimal right of equal access or that it is 
fundamental as a matter of due process. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2118 (2005). 
 33 Sometimes it is rooted in an understanding of the body as being integral to a 
concept of personal autonomy or negative freedom against governmental intrusion. See 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the state forcibly pumping a 
suspect’s stomach for evidence “shocks the conscience”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person . . . .”). At other points, it reflects a positive right to privacy, which indirectly 
protects some forms of reproductive sexuality. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 
(1973) (recognizing a sphere of personal privacy that protected a variety of autonomous 
decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972) (protecting a right to the use 
of contraception, regardless of marital status). 
 34 The Court has explored the scope of other important rights in situations of 
incapacity. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment, which can 
be exercised through surrogates during periods of incapacity). 
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rather than as a general status.35 For instance, one might lack the capacity to 
engage in complex financial transactions, but still have the capacity to decide 
whether to eat broccoli or asparagus for lunch. Thus, we have numerous 
decisional capacity “switches,” which may be flipped on or off in various 
constellations. These switches may be understood either mentally or legally.36 
Mental incapacity is the condition of lacking the requisite psychological 
abilities to engage in autonomous decision-making.37 The primary form is 
cognitive incapacity, or the inability to process decisions. In this situation, one 
either cannot appreciate information necessary to understand a decision or has 
defects in reasoning and judgment. In shorthand: “She didn’t know what she 
was doing.”38 Mental incapacity is the product not only of internal 
psychological faculties but also of external circumstances. For example, 
people with Alzheimer’s Disease sometimes experience the phenomenon of 
“sundowning.”39 These individuals may be relatively lucid when waking up in 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 
TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 23 (1998) 
(discussing how capacity must be considered in terms of “the match or mismatch between 
the patient’s abilities and the decision-making demands of the situation that the patient 
faces”); Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1176 
(2007) (arguing that judges created a “default legal person” whose capacities varied by the 
doctrinal area in question); Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity: 
The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 305 
(2006) (discussing the different levels of capacity required for different legal tasks).  
 36 Some authors call what I refer to as mental capacity simply as “capacity” while 
referring to the legal evaluation of mental capacity as “competence.” See, e.g., Michael L. 
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and 
the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 263 (2014). 
 37 See generally Kathryn Kaye & Jim Grigsby, Medical Factors Affecting Mental 
Capacity, in CHANGES IN DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY IN OLDER ADULTS 91 (Sara Honn 
Qualls & Michael A. Smyer eds., 2007) (describing the various conditions that can cause 
decreases in mental capacity). 
 38 See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 316–17 (1986). 
The second type of mental incapacity is volitional incapacity, in which one can take in 
information and reason about it, but cannot act in accordance with it. As an example, an 
individual with certain serious forms of obsessive-compulsive disorder might find herself 
under some kind of compulsion to act, even if it might not be what she wants. In shorthand, 
this translates as “She couldn’t help herself.” See id. The third type of mental incapacity is 
communicative incapacity, or the inability to express a decision to others. For example, an 
individual who has suffered a stroke may be fully capable of forming preferences, 
processing information, and coming to a decision, but cannot express this choice to others. 
See id.; see also George J. Demakis, State Statutory Definitions of Civil 
Incompetency/Incapacity: Issues for Psychologists, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 331, 332 
(2013) (noting that several states explicitly require communication skills in their incapacity 
statutes).  
 39 See Ladislav Volicer et al., Sundowning and Circadian Rhythms in Alzheimer’s 
Disease, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 704, 704–05 (2001). 
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the morning, but at sundown their dementia will increase, leading to confusion 
and the inability to process decisions.40 
Legal incapacity, in contrast, is the condition of lacking the requisite legal 
authority to engage in autonomous decision-making. Put another way, the 
legal capacity inquiry determines whether a person is a legally recognized 
subject or not.41 Legal capacity is a prerequisite to making various decisions, 
such as voting, getting married, or hiring a lawyer.42 Being deemed a legally 
recognized subject may also expose an individual to negative consequences to 
which a person who lacks legal capacity would not be subject, such as criminal 
liability for illegal acts.43 
This Article uses the term legal incapacity doctrine to refer to any civil or 
criminal legal doctrine that deems an individual to lack decisional capacity in a 
particular domain. Sexual incapacity doctrines refer to those doctrines that do 
this with respect to sexual decision-making. In other words, even if one gives 
unambiguous, verbal, affirmative consent to sex—what I call apparent 
consent—this “Yes” may be transformed into a legal “No” by the sexual 
incapacity doctrine.44 Sexual incapacity doctrines are part and parcel of a legal 
regime of sexual consent.45 They serve to vitiate apparent consent due to some 
internal problem with perception, cognition, or emotion.46 This contrasts with 
                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. 
 41 See Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of 
Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 321, 323 (2003) (“The determination 
of incapacity represents a crucial dividing line between legal subjects and those who are 
the object of legal protections.”). 
 42 See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 
256 (1997) (noting that capacity to marry is one of the few elements of common law 
marriage); Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family: Towards a New Representational Model for 
Parents and Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 303, 334 (2011) (discussing the 
requirements of Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.14, governing attorney 
interactions with clients of diminished capacity); Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on 
the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 935–45 (2007) (reviewing the 
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring capacity to vote). 
 43 See generally Arlie Loughnan, Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law, 15 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (reviewing how mental incapacity doctrines play out in 
criminal law). 
 44 See Emily J. Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge 
to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1183 
(2011) (discussing this transformation in the context of statutory rape). Just because one 
cannot give legal consent to sex does not mean that one cannot dissent from sex. See 
People v. Thompson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 810 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Even a severely disabled 
person may object to a sexual touching because he or she finds it unpleasant—a ‘bad 
touch’; this does not necessarily mean he or she could give legal consent.”). 
 45 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 215 (2003). 
 46 See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING 
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 141 (2005). 
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coercion or deception doctrines, which focus on external factors that vitiate 
consent because it is not voluntary or informed.47 
Mental and legal incapacity converge in many cases. Consider a recent 
case of intoxication and rape from Vanderbilt University.48 On June 23, 2013, 
a young woman was drinking with several football players at an establishment 
called the Tin Roof Bar.49 On the way back to their dorm, she passed out.50 
Several of the football players carried her body to the room of one of the 
players and proceeded to penetrate her mouth and vagina with their fingers and 
penises, as well as to insert a water bottle into her anus.51 All the while, they 
documented the event with their cell phones and sent text messages to other 
players.52 The sexual incapacity doctrine uncontroversially applies in cases 
such as this, when the subject is unconscious.53 The lack of consciousness 
means that there is no capacity or opportunity to express volition—either in 
acceptance or refusal of sexual contact.54 Two of the Vanderbilt players have 
been convicted of rape, with other involved players facing a variety of 
charges.55 
Mental and legal evaluations of incapacity may also diverge. One may be 
deemed legally capable when one arguably does not have the mental capacity 
for certain decisions. The application of the mature minor doctrine to minors 
who are convicted of serious crimes may be such an example.56 Conversely, 
one may in fact be able to make certain decisions—in other words, one may 
                                                                                                                     
 47 This is not to say that these doctrines do not overlap or interact in many cases. See 
id. at 141–42 (“Notice that sometimes these categories are blurred, for 
example, . . . someone who is mentally retarded, an internal condition, is more likely to 
believe something that a ‘normal’ adult would not, and thereby would be more vulnerable 
to fraud.”). 
 48 See Tony Gonzalez, What Happened in the Vanderbilt Dorm? Rape Trial Starts 
Monday, TENNESSEAN (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2014/ 
11/01/happened-dorm-room-vanderbilt-rape-trial-starts-monday/18277999/ [http://perma.cc/ 
XL4J-UPF4]. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See Tony Gonzalez, Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Complete List of Charges, 
TENNESSEAN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2015/01/27/ 
vandebilt-rape-trial-verdict-breakdown/22385025/ [http://perma.cc/97C5-PF7F]. 
 52 See Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Defendants Found Guilty on all Charges, TENNESSEAN 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2015/01/27/vanderbilt-rape-case-
verdicts/22419381/ [http://perma.cc/QBK2-TN33]. 
 53 See Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56, 59–60 (Pa. 1997) (accepting that 
unconscious sex is rape but exploring what unconsciousness means in the context of the 
Pennsylvania statute). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Vanderbilt Rape Trial: Defendants Found Guilty on all Charges, supra note 52 
(noting that the deliberations took three hours for a trial that lasted 12 days). 
 56 See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 547, 548 (2000) (noting that even “[y]ouths who are in elementary school may be 
deemed adults for purposes of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment”). 
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not be psychologically impaired at all—but be deemed legally incapable of 
doing so. An example of this is the doctrine of coverture, which deemed a 
married woman legally incapable of making decisions about property because 
her legal personality had merged with that of her husband.57 
There are four primary types of mental incapacity, which are primarily 
differentiated by their temporal scopes.58 Temporary extended incapacity, such 
as minority (i.e. being a minor), has a long duration but a definite end point. 
The mental incapacity is due to the fact that the individual’s psychological 
faculties are not yet mature, but almost everyone will eventually age out of this 
condition.59 In contrast to minority, temporary transient incapacity is 
relatively short-lived—it comes and goes. Examples include intoxication, 
episodic mental illness, or bouts of delirium.60 Persistent lifelong incapacity 
does not go away and exists from a very early age. There is no “aging out,” 
and there is no “wearing off.” The paradigmatic example is intellectual 
disability, an umbrella term for a variety of cognitive impairments, including 
genetic conditions such as Down Syndrome.61 Finally, persistent acquired 
incapacity exists when a person suffers an impairment that does not go away, 
but which arises after a period of relatively unimpaired functioning.62 The 
paradigmatic example is dementia. The persistent incapacities are the primary 
                                                                                                                     
 57 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 841–48 
(2004) (reviewing the place of coverture in the canon of family law but noting its continued 
existence in other forms). 
 58 See DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW 96 (2007) 
(discussing the “non-ideal-types” that deviate from the standard capable subject: “Some 
involve ostensible agents who are temporarily incapacitated or who have incapacitated 
themselves; some involve potential ostensible agents; some involve parties who are no 
longer ostensible agents; and some parties who never have been and never will be 
ostensible agents.”). 
 59 See DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 116 (1998) (“They are not permanently 
disabled since they will (normally) acquire this capacity with age.”); Jennifer Ann Drobac 
& Leslie A. Hulvershorn, The Neurobiology of Decision Making in High-Risk Youth and 
the Law of Consent to Sex, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 502, 504 (2014) (arguing that 
neurobiological evidence demonstrates that juveniles have different and less developed 
cognitive processes for sexual decision-making). Unfortunately, some individuals pass 
away before they reach the age of majority. 
 60 See FEINBERG, supra note 38, at 320–21 (noting that sometimes these conditions 
can be recurring). 
 61 See Natalie Cheung, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of 
Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 321–25 
(2013) (describing the different definitions of intellectual disability adopted by various 
professional organizations). 
 62 This raises interesting and difficult issues of personal identity, as the preexisting 
self may have sexual interests that extend to the present impaired self. See A. Harry Lesser, 
Dementia and Personal Identity, in DEMENTIA: MIND, MEANING, AND THE PERSON 55, 56–
61 (Julian C. Hughes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the relationship of one’s self to one’s 
past); Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Sexual Expression and Intimacy Between Nursing Home 
Residents with Dementia: Balancing the Current Interests and Prior Values of 
Heterosexual and LGBT Residents, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 459, 460 (2012). 
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focus of this Article, as the law is currently poorly calibrated to their unique 
nature.63 
B. Liability and Social Norms 
Sexual incapacity doctrines exert regulatory control by imposing legal 
liability and influencing social norms about sexuality. The primary target for 
liability is the sexual partner of the person lacking legal capacity. Secondary 
targets are individuals or institutions that in some way have responsibility for 
individuals deemed to lack capacity.64 Criminal liability arises from 
prohibitions on rape or sexual assault, which are applied to the sexual partner 
of the person lacking legal capacity.65 Civil liability arises from tortious 
battery, which involves a tortfeasor engaging in harmful or offensive contact.66 
Consent serves as an affirmative defense to such a claim, but that defense is 
unavailable when the party in question is incapable of consenting.67 In 
                                                                                                                     
 63 It is important to keep in mind that these types of incapacity are not mutually 
exclusive. See, e.g., KATE GORDON ET AL., IDD AND DEMENTIA 28 (July 2015), 
http://www.aoa.acl.gov/AoA_Programs/HPW/Alz_Grants/docs/IDD-and-Dementia.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/BAR8-DND8] (discussing the challenges of identifying and providing 
services to those who have both intellectual disabilities, a persistent lifelong incapacity, 
and dementia, a persistent acquired incapacity). In addition, people with persistent lifelong 
incapacity experience the temporary extended incapacity of minority, and anyone can 
experience the temporary transient incapacity of intoxication along with one of the other 
forms of incapacity. 
 64 See, e.g., Lindeman v. The Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1208 (D. Colo. 2014) (church); Bjerke v. Johnson, 
727 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (farm employer); Doe v. Mama Taori’s 
Premium Pizza, LLC, No. M1998-00992-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 327906, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 5, 2001) (restaurant employer).  
 65 See TORCIA, supra note 9, § 282; Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the 
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1780, 1797–98 (1992) (discussing the liability regime of criminal rape). Sexual incapacity 
doctrines can be helpful to prosecutors when consent is ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. 
Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting how prosecutors used evidence 
of incapacity to prove lack of consent when complainant and defendant dispute whether 
sex was consensual). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“An actor is 
subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other 
directly or indirectly results.”); id. § 18 (substantially the same provision but offensive 
contact results); Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in 
Civil Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 67–
84 (2006) (describing how tort suits may be a useful alternative to criminal trials for 
victims of sexual assault). 
 67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“To be 
effective, consent must be (a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person 
empowered to consent for him, and (b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the 
1214 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:6 
addition to that direct civil liability, there may be vicarious civil liability for 
institutions. For example, the family of a nursing home resident might press a 
claim for negligent supervision if that resident was sexually battered while in 
the institution’s care.68 
Finally, institutions face a body of regulatory law that punishes them for 
inappropriately caring for people who lack capacity and who are in their 
care.69 This may include the loss of state or federal funding, which would have 
disastrous consequences for institutions that are reliant on such money.70 It 
could further include loss of accreditation by relevant quasi-governmental 
regulatory bodies.71 Finally, individuals that work at such institutions might 
face sanctions in the form of revocation of professional licensure.72 
These impacts were on display in a recent case in which a 78-year old man 
and an 87-year old woman, both with dementia, were discovered having sex in 
                                                                                                                     
same conduct.”). See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: 
Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) (exploring how intent and 
consent play out in the tort of battery). 
 68 See, e.g., Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1190 (Alaska 
2009) (adjudicating a vicarious liability claim for sexual assault of cognitively impaired 
patient by certified nurse’s assistant); Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone Cty. Skilled Nursing 
Facility, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Ark. 2001) (adjudicating a negligent supervision claim 
for sexual assault of a semi-comatose patient); Jennifer Gimler Brady, Long-Term Care 
Under Fire: A Case for Rational Enforcement, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 40 
(2001) (“Tort lawsuits against nursing homes, as well as the size of verdicts in such cases, 
are increasing at an alarming pace.”); Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice Liability in Long-
Term Care: A Changing Environment, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1991) 
(discussing the increasing liability concerns of nursing homes); Michael L. Rustad, 
Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious 
Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 385–87 (2006) (noting that forty-two percent 
of cases against nursing homes used a negligent supervision theory). 
 69 See Philip C. Aka et al., Political Factors and Enforcement of the Nursing Home 
Regulatory Regime, 24 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (2011) (discussing the history of nursing home 
regulations). 
 70 See William Pipal, You Don’t Have to Go Home but You Can’t Stay Here: The 
Current State of Federal Nursing Home Involuntary Discharge Laws, 20 ELDER L.J. 235, 
247–48 (2012) (“Because nursing homes receive more than sixty percent of their income 
from Medicaid and Medicare, the loss of federal funding can have significant financial 
consequences.”). 
 71 See Frederick Robinson & Melissa Thompson, Accreditation, Licensure, 
Certification, and Surveying Bodies, in 3 RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR 
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 53, 60–62 (Glenn T. Troyer ed., 6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK] (describing the work of the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the voluntary body that accredits many health 
care organizations). 
 72 See Carl F. Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for 
Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 55, 70–84 (2011) 
(examining the licensing and disciplinary functions of state boards); Jennifer P. Lundblad, 
Rethinking Patient Safety Regulation: A Framework for Evaluating Regulatory Tools, 32 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 437, 438–41 (2011) (describing the professional licensing 
regime). 
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a nursing home.73 When nurses tried to remove the woman from the situation, 
she screamed and bit and kicked them, showing her displeasure with the 
termination of the sexual contact. The head administrative staff had to 
determine whether to report the incident to the Iowa Department of 
Inspections and Appeals as a sexual assault. They concluded that no report 
was necessary, because there was no injury or evidence of force, and the 
woman appeared to consent to the encounter. They did, however, tell the 
families of the residents about the encounter, and the family of the woman 
sued the nursing home and nursing home staff, alleging rape. The Iowa 
Department of Inspections and Appeals caught wind of the situation, fined the 
nursing home, and threatened a loss of Medicaid and Medicare funding. The 
nursing home responded by expelling the man in the encounter to a nursing 
home more than two hours away from his family and firing the director of 
nursing and the nursing home administrator. The Iowa Board of Nursing 
revoked the license of the director of nursing as well.74 
In addition to these explicit legal and regulatory effects, the law has 
expressive effects when it invalidates the apparent consent choices of those 
who are deemed to lack legal capacity.75 This is clearest in the case of criminal 
prohibitions, which carry the weight of societal condemnation for the acts that 
are deemed criminal.76 But both civil and criminal doctrines act to construct 
the sexualities of citizens by demarcating the boundaries of acceptable and 
unacceptable sex and reinforcing existing understandings of the sexuality of 
certain groups.77 Thus, the sanction and expressive functions of the law work 
in mutually reinforcing ways to regulate sexuality both in the behavior and 
attitudes of the people they govern. 
                                                                                                                     
 73 This narrative is adapted from Gruley, supra note 11, and Steve Drobot, Case No. 
11-003, (Iowa Bd. of Nursing Home Adm’rs Sept. 11, 2012) (notice of hearing and 
statement of charges), http://www.idph.state.ia.us/IDPHChannelsService/file.ashx?file= 
AEA204EE-AC91-428C-90E3-173949AE5407 [http://perma.cc/2QGL-SVPE]. 
 74 After a hearing, the Iowa Board of Nursing Home Administrators concluded that 
the nursing home administrator should keep his license. See Drobot, supra note 73, at 25. 
 75 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514–27 (2000) (examining the difficulties 
of conceptualizing the state as an agent of expression); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive 
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (1996) (“Many debates over the 
appropriate content of law are really debates over the statement that law makes, 
independent of its (direct) consequences. . . . [T]he expressive function of law has a great 
deal to do with the effects of law on prevailing social norms.”). 
 76 See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970); CHARLES FRIED, AN 
ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 125–32 (1970). 
 77 See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 128–31 (1992) (discussing 
how the law’s regulation of sex creates a certain normative vision of sexuality); Kate 
Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of 
Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 313 (2003) (describing how the 
law helps to construct adolescent sexuality). 
1216 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:6 
C. Problems with Existing Approaches 
In criminal law, state statutes prescribe sexual incapacity. The standard 
statutory construction is to list a variety of incapacitating conditions that 
vitiate consent, including everything from age to intoxication, mental disorder, 
being asleep, or being in the custody of the state.78 Other statutes use more 
general language, just referencing “mental incapacity” or “unsoundness of 
mind.”79 Courts have interpreted this more general language flexibly, 
including various conditions under it.80 In tort law, judges often draw from the 
criminal law’s methods of constructing incapacity on a case-by-case basis.81 
After the conditions potentially constituting incapacity have been 
identified and labeled, courts must flesh out what these identifying labels mean 
                                                                                                                     
 78 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(1)(b) (2010) (“The victim is incapable 
of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other 
similar impairment of cognition . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (2015) (separating out 
minority, mental illness or unsoundness of mind, involuntary intoxication, 
unconsciousness, in legal custody, or under educational supervision); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 22.011(b) (West 2011) (listing eleven different conditions). People with persistent 
cognitive impairments are often referred to by antiquated terms such as “mentally 
defective.” See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(A) (2013). Even when statutes spell out these different situations of 
incapacity, courts sometimes interpret factual situations that would clearly fall under one 
prong of the statute under another prong. See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 721 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“It appears the ‘incapacity’ alternative of section 709.4(2)(a) is 
generally applied in cases of retarded or low-functioning victims. However, nothing in the 
statute or case law indicates the term ‘incapacity’ could not extend to a person rendered 
unconscious from intoxication.” (citations omitted)). 
 79 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2014) (“If any person has sexual 
intercourse with a complaining witness, whether or not his or her spouse . . . through the 
use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical helplessness . . . he or she 
shall be guilty of rape.”). Mental incapacity is often provided for in a definitions section. 
See id. § 18.2-67.10(3) (defining “mental incapacity” as “condition of the complaining 
witness existing at the time of an offense under this article which prevents the complaining 
witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act involved in such 
offense and about which the accused knew or should have known”); see also IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-6101(3) (Supp. 2015) (“unsoundness of mind”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(2) (Supp. 
2015) (same). 
 80 See, e.g., Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va. 2006) (rejecting a 
construction of the Virginia statute that would not include intoxication under the definition 
of the mental incapacity); see also Ragsdale v. State, 23 P.3d 653, 656–57 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2001) (construing “mentally incapable” to include intoxication, a temporary 
impairment); Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (construing 
“mentally incapable” to include a woman with mental retardation, a persistent impairment). 
 81 See, e.g., Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 539 (Neb. 1996) (noting that the 
criminal law analysis of consent is “equally applicable in tort law”); Wilson v. Tobiassen, 
777 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that incapacity under criminal statutes 
extends to civil cases); C.C.H. v. Philadelphia Phillies, Inc., 940 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. 2008) 
(“[E]vidence of the victim’s consent to sexual contact, like in criminal proceedings, is not 
an available defense in determining a defendant’s civil liability.”). 
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through legal tests. For the temporary extended incapacity of minors, this is an 
easy task, as all states have adopted a bright-line age of consent rule for sexual 
activity, typically set between sixteen or eighteen years of age.82 The bright-
line age of consent rule embodies multiple policy aims, such as preventing 
those who lack mental capacity from making unwise decisions and protecting 
individuals from coercion, whereas these doctrines are unbundled for adults.83 
This treatment of sexual incapacity for minors is justified by the fact that the 
age of consent rule represents only a temporary disability, and everyone will 
eventually outgrow the incapacity.84 It is also highly administrable, as it only 
requires evidence of age.85 
For adults, sexual incapacity is considered as a separate doctrine, which is 
typically more standard-like in form.86 A key feature of many states’ legal 
tests is that they focus narrowly on the mental capacities of the subject. At the 
most basic level, these tests require that an individual have the capacity to 
understand that there is a decision to be made and that she has the ability to 
say yes or no, to consent or not.87 Beyond this, tests vary. Some are relatively 
underdeveloped, focusing simply on evidence of disability88 or on whether a 
                                                                                                                     
 82 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2010) (eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West Supp. 2015) (seventeen); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200.364(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (sixteen). The picture is complicated slightly by 
“Romeo and Juliet” exceptions in many states, which permit sex between minors or 
between minors and adults who are close in age. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-
A:3(II) (Supp. 2014) (permitting sexual relations with someone aged 13–16 if within four 
years of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 3252(c)(2) (2009) (permitting sexual relations 
between individuals aged fifteen to nineteen). Some states have also adopted marital 
exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West 2014) (“Unlawful sexual 
intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the 
spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor.”). In these cases, the court merely has to 
ascertain the ages or marital status of the sexual partners in question. 
 83 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22, 58–59 (1992) (noting how rules captures background policies imperfectly while 
standards apply them directly). 
 84 See ARCHARD, supra note 59, at 116. 
 85 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a 
decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts.”). Whether or not this form of the rule is correct or desirable is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but if states were to depart from such a bright-line rule, this Article’s analysis 
of the appropriate legal test might prove useful. See generally Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or 
Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 311 (2010) (providing 
helpful analysis of some of these age-of-consent issues). 
 86 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it 
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background 
principle or policy to a fact situation.”).  
 87 See, e.g., In re David K., No. 1 CA-JV 08-0182, 2009 WL 1606018, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. June 9, 2009) (showing the court’s discomfort with the victim’s inability to express 
discontent). 
 88 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 381 So. 2d 1019, 1021–22 (Miss. 1980) (“Here, the 
proof shows without contradiction that the victim was mentally incapable of consenting to 
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person can exercise “judgment.”89 In states with more developed tests, courts 
tend to analyze whether an individual has the ability to understand the nature 
and consequences of sexual activity.90 Courts typically group consequences 
into physical and nonphysical categories.91 The physical consequences include 
the possibility of pleasurable sexual release, pregnancy, or sexually 
transmitted diseases. Nonphysical consequences consist of the potential 
feelings of mental pleasure or displeasure from the sexual encounter, mental 
consequences for one’s sense of self, or social consequences in the form of 
changes in the nature of relationships with others. 
New York has adopted a broad test for determining capacity, requiring the 
ability “to appraise the sexual act, its significance and its consequences,” 
including consideration of the “‘moral quality’ of the act as it would be 
measured by society.”92 This incorporates moral consequences into the test, an 
approach that few courts have followed, often citing problems with the 
vagueness of this standard.93 North Dakota’s case law is characteristic of a 
more moderate and common approach, requiring that an individual 
“understand the nature of the sexual act as well as its consequences such as 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases but not the moral nature of their 
participation in the act of intercourse.”94 
                                                                                                                     
sexual intercourse.”); State v. Burks, 267 S.E.2d 752, 753 (W. Va. 1980) (merely repeating 
the statutory language stating that someone who is “mentally defective or mentally 
incapacitated” cannot consent). 
 89 See Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 271–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring “a female 
victim, who due to the degree of mental retardation suffered, is incapable of giving an 
intelligent assent or dissent and to exercise judgment”); State v. Willenbring, 454 N.W.2d 
268, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (repeating the statutory language requiring “judgment to 
give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration”). 
 90 Note that capacity does not require actual knowledge of the consequences of sex; it 
just requires the capacity to process whatever these consequences might be. Of course, 
whether one has actual knowledge may be relevant to the inquiry into whether one has the 
capacity to acquire such knowledge. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, No. 99AP-819, 2000 WL 
675042, at *6–7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2000) (finding probative the victim’s lack of 
understanding of social mores). 
 91 For another typology, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 111 
(1992), categorizing the consequences as “procreative, hedonistic, and sociable.” 
 92 People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1333 (N.Y. 1977); see also People v. Cox, 709 
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (noting as relevant that the victim could not 
understand the repercussions of engaging in homosexual acts with the perpetrator); People 
v. Breck, 584 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“We find persuasive, and therefore 
adopt, the reasoning contained in the Easley decision and hold that the statutory language 
in question is meant to encompass not only an understanding of the physical act but also an 
appreciation of the nonphysical factors, including the moral quality of the act, that 
accompany such an act.”). 
 93 See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa 1980) (striking down as 
unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring “the mental capacity to know the right and 
wrong of conduct in sexual matters”). 
 94 State v. Mosbrucker, 758 N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 2008). 
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The nature and consequences test has its conceptual merits, especially in 
its application to situations of temporary transient incapacity.95 In those 
situations, it serves to protect a baseline non-impaired self (who will reemerge) 
against sexual exploitation by others while one is in a temporarily altered 
mental state.96 Because of the relatively short duration of the incapacity in that 
context, the restriction on sexual opportunities is relatively minor. In contrast, 
people with persistent incapacity may face lifetime restrictions on sexual 
activity if their cognitive abilities are deemed inadequate. There is also no 
non-impaired self who will reemerge to benefit from any restriction that is 
placed on sexual activity.97 This result also has concrete effects on social and 
                                                                                                                     
 95 This is not to say that the test is without its problems. First, the level of incapacity 
at the time of the encounter is often difficult to assess because the incapacitating condition 
wears off, often before incapacity can be evaluated. See Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with 
Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. 
REV. 899, 902 (2008) (reviewing methods of determining whether there is capacity to 
consent in situations of intoxication). Second, many intoxication cases involve situations of 
voluntary and mutual intoxication, and courts sometimes pick up on this contextual fact to 
protect male defendants and disadvantage female complainants. See Karen M. Kramer, 
Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance 
Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (1994) (“If the rapist was drunk, it reduces his 
culpability, but if the victim was drunk, it increases her culpability.”). Scholars have 
struggled with how to deal with these issues. See Falk, supra note 14, at 187–88 (arguing 
for the intoxication to be specifically referenced in statutes and involuntary intoxication 
and subsequent “rape by drugs” to be punished more severely); Christine Chambers 
Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 
2009 BYU L. REV. 57, 86 (2009) (arguing for a sliding-scale notion of consent in 
intoxicated encounters); Clare Carlson, Comment, “This Bitch Got Drunk and Did This to 
Herself:” Proposed Evidentiary Reforms to Limit “Victim Blaming” and “Perpetrator 
Pardoning” in Rape by Intoxication Trials in California, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
285, 308–10 (2014) (arguing for the inadmissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication 
under California rules). 
 96 In fact, this reasoning derives from the traditional distinction at common law 
between the lunatic, whose condition was temporary, and the idiot, whose condition was 
lifelong and persistent. See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the 
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16–18 (1990) (describing how the 
Crown was limited in its control over the lunatic’s property because if the lunatic regained 
capacity, her property would have to be returned to her). 
 97 One could argue that a mitigating factor for those with persistent acquired 
incapacity is that they already had sexual opportunities early in life. In other words, they 
had their “fair innings.” See, e.g., Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration 
of the ‘Fair Innings’ Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117, 129 (1997) (making this argument in 
the allocation of health care). This argument is not valid in this context, for two reasons. 
First, persistent acquired incapacity can strike at any age, even if it might affect older 
adults more. This raises the question of where to draw the line of when one has achieved 
sufficient sexual opportunities. Second, this argument is typically applied in situations of 
scarce resources, when one has to trade off between two individuals who need the same 
resource. Sexual opportunities are not limited resources in the same way, and allowing 
more people sexual opportunities will actually have the effect of increasing potential sexual 
partners for others.  
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sexual norms. To the degree that a class of individuals is deemed to lack 
sexual consent capacity, this can devalue them and construct them either as 
asexual and undesirable or as hypersexual and in need of control.98 
Thus, the nature and consequences test leads to undesirable outcomes in 
two important contexts in which it is applied—persistent lifelong incapacity 
and persistent acquired incapacity—creating the need for an alternative test for 
persistent cognitive impairments. This problem has not gone unrecognized by 
courts or in the legal scholarship, but the proposed solutions have their own 
significant drawbacks. For example, in an attempt to get away from tests that 
focus on the mental capacity to judge consequences, New Jersey follows a 
“nature of the conduct” test, as expressed in State v. Olivio: 
The cognitive capacity . . . involves the knowledge that the conduct is 
distinctively sexual. In the context of this criminal statute, that knowledge 
extends only to the physical or physiological aspects of sex; it does not 
extend to an awareness that sexual acts have probable serious consequences, 
such as pregnancy and birth, disease, infirmities, adverse psychological or 
emotional disorders, or possible adverse moral or social effects.99 
This is a rather minimal requirement of capacity, requiring volition but not 
an understanding of the consequences of sex.100 This test would certainly 
allow a wide range of sexual activity by people with persistent cognitive 
impairments. However, it would place them at risk of significant welfare 
threats by permitting sexual activity merely if they said “yes,” even if they had 
no capacity to understand the consequences of the decision, such as pregnancy 
or sexually transmitted diseases. 
Instead of narrowing the sexual incapacity inquiry to mere volition, many 
scholars have instead suggested widening the inquiry beyond the mental 
capacities of the subject when looking at persistent cognitive impairments. 
                                                                                                                     
 98 See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues 
and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 118–24 (1994) (discussing the 
history of “asexual objectification”); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: 
The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1325 (2009) 
(discussing the hypersexualization of people with disabilities); Ralph Sandland, Sex and 
Capacity: The Management of Monsters?, 76 MODERN L. REV. 981, 982–83 (2013) 
(discussing how the “animal instincts” doctrine painted females with cognitive 
impairments as dangerous). 
 99 State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604–05 (N.J. 1991). 
 100 It is not entirely clear how many courts, including in New Jersey, actually follow 
this approach. The statutory language in many states includes the term “nature of the 
conduct,” but few seem to follow Olivio explicitly, and some adopt a nature and 
consequences test in spite of more limited statutory language. See State v. Mosbrucker, 758 
N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 2008) (creating a nature and consequences test despite having 
“nature of his or her conduct” language in the relevant statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
03(1)(e)); People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (same, although 
creating a totality of the circumstances test instead); Denno, supra note 15, at 345 n.188 
(noting that other courts tend not to follow Olivio directly). 
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Professor Deborah Denno’s test is emblematic and the most prominent of 
these approaches.101 Her “contextual approach” would assess not only the 
intellectual capacities of the subject, but also the “factual, moral, and 
contextual aspects of each case.”102 The inquiry would be guided by the 
principle that people with persistent cognitive impairments should not be 
judged by a higher consent standard than those without these impairments.103 
This approach may be compatible with the case law of certain states, such as 
Illinois, which has adopted a broad “totality of the circumstances” test for 
sexual incapacity, allowing a consideration of a host of factors.104 
This open-ended flight to context poses its own difficulties. Without 
further specificity, all facts are potentially relevant to the capacity inquiry 
under the contextual approach.105 The proffered limiting principle is helpful to 
the extent that it prohibits blanket restrictions on sexual activity due just to 
cognitive impairments, but it provides little guidance beyond that.106 This has 
two negative effects. First, it provides no predictability to institutions that 
house people with persistent incapacities about whether they will be exposed 
to liability by permitting residents to engage in sexual activity. In fact, it may 
create more uncertainty than the current regime, as it widens the factual 
inquiry by the court. This will perhaps make institutions even more fearful of 
liability and cause them to restrict sexual environments further. 
Second, it delegates to the courts the task of sorting out what factual, 
moral or contextual factors might be relevant to the capacity inquiry. Inviting 
judges to make somewhat unrestricted normative judgments in the area of 
capacity is a perilous endeavor, as the checkered history of incapacity 
doctrines demonstrates.107 Putting judges in charge of sexual judgments will 
serve to promote certain types of mainstream sexual relationships and 
                                                                                                                     
 101 See Denno, supra note 15, at 355–56. 
 102 Id. at 359. 
 103 Id. at 355. 
 104 See Whitten, 647 N.E.2d at 1067. 
 105 The complexity of the decisional domain does not necessarily demand such an 
open-ended test. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 586–96 (1992) (distinguishing complexity from the choice of a rule or 
standard). 
 106 The limit on blanket restrictions seems to be the focus of this principle in Professor 
Denno’s applications. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 15, at 369–70 (“By implicitly 
presuming that Betty may not be able to consent to sexual intercourse under any 
circumstances, the court’s ruling also ensured that she would be judged from a higher 
consent standard than her nonretarded counterpart.”). Of course, one could argue that 
people with cognitive impairments are de facto being held to a higher consent standard by 
virtue of having their mental capacity evaluated by third parties at all. This further 
reinforces the point that the principle provides insufficient guidance in application. 
 107 See Knauer, supra note 41, at 341–42 (noting that capacity doctrines have been 
used to oppress various groups in society). See generally Susan Stefan, Silencing the 
Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763 (1993) 
(arguing that capacity has been used as a way of obscuring the power differentials that 
women face). 
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practices over other, more deviant ones.108 In addition, the exercise of this 
judicial authority to prohibit certain forms of sexual expression will typically 
fall hardest on those with disfavored sexualities, such as women, racial 
minorities, people with disabilities, older adults, and sexual minorities.109 In 
short, some context is needed to escape the problems of the nature and 
consequences test, but the contextual inquiry needs more structure to constrain 
judges in their judgments and to make those judgments more predictable.110 
                                                                                                                     
 108 See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of 
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 281 (Carole S. 
Vance ed., 1984) (describing how society typically divides up “good sex” and “bad sex”). 
 109 See MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL 
AGENCY 17 (2015) (“Notions about the ability to be sexual are intertwined with gendered, 
classed, and racialized assessments of fitness.”); Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Rural Sexual 
Minorities, and the Courts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 566 (2013) (describing how these 
biases can disadvantage rural sexual minorities); Elaine Craig, Capacity to Consent to 
Sexual Risk, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 103, 108–13 (2014) (arguing that avoiding normative 
assessment of sex better serves women and sexual minorities); Helen Meekosha, Body 
Battles: Bodies, Gender, and Disability, in THE DISABILITY READER 163, 173–78 (Tom 
Shakespeare ed., 1998) (describing the regulation and surveillance of female disabled 
bodies); Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2007) (reviewing approaches critical of judicial methods of securing sexual freedom); 
Michael B. Shortnacy, Sexual Minorities, Criminal Justice, and the Death Penalty, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 231, 231 (2005) (noting how such bias operates against sexual 
minorities, undercutting other legal victories). 
 110 The contextual models of other scholars are subject to similar objections. 
Professors Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, writing from the Canadian perspective, 
propose that sexual capacity tests should focus on the contextual factors of the power 
dynamics of the relationship, coercion, and voluntariness. See Janine Benedet & Isabel 
Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: 
Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief, 52 MCGILL L.J. 243, 279–87 (2007). While the 
authors’ focus on combating sexual abuse of women with disabilities is laudable, their test 
collapses the capacity and coercion inquiries, concentrating on the latter. This creates a 
robust coercion doctrine, which is valuable, especially in abuse of trust cases where a 
professional engages in sexual relations with a vulnerable client with disabilities. This 
approach, however, fails to provide a positive account of when people with persistent 
cognitive impairments can attain legal capacity and exercise their sexual capabilities. This 
truncated understanding of capacity creates an opening for judges to impose their own 
views about sexual morality in discriminatory ways. 
Working in the context of adolescents, Professor Jennifer Ann Drobac has proposed 
an intriguing sexual capacity standard of legal assent. This is a form of consent that is 
voidable by the minor after the fact for tort law purposes if it is in the best interests of the 
subject to do so, while at the same time maintaining the possibility of independent criminal 
law prosecution. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, 
Teenagers, and the Sting to “the Age of Consent,” 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 113–15 (2011). 
This test was developed in the context of the temporary extended incapacity of minority, 
and it might be a poor fit for more persistent forms of incapacity. Delegating the contextual 
analysis of “best interests” to the minor avoids the problem of judicial overreach, but a 
regime of voidable consent provides little predictability for institutions, caregivers, or 
sexual partners about how to proceed in the face of someone who has cognitive 
impairments and sexual desires. In addition, it does not touch on criminal law doctrines, 
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Part II defined the relevant terms for the argument in this Article and 
described how the law operates to restrict sexual activity through the liability it 
imposes and the social norms it reinforces. Finally, it set out the basic problem 
with the dominant nature and consequences test: it overly restricts the sexual 
lives of people living in contexts of persistent lifelong incapacity and 
persistent acquired incapacity. The alternatives have their own problems. The 
nature of the conduct test opens up the possibility of too many welfare threats, 
and the contextual approach gives too much leeway to judges to decide the 
sexual lives of people with disabilities and provides no predictability about 
liability exposure. The next part lays the groundwork for reforming sexual 
incapacity doctrine by evaluating the normative bases of the doctrine while 
also examining the lived experiences of people with persistent incapacities. 
III. NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS AND LIVED EXPERIENCES 
The issues with adult sexual incapacity doctrines identified in Part II 
derive from both theoretical and practical sources. The theoretical source is the 
autonomy value that underlies and heavily influences the form of the current 
doctrine.111 Cognitive capacity is cast as a necessary precondition of that 
autonomy, and thus a legal test that solely inquires into the cognitive 
capacities of the subject is seen as vindicating that value.112 This 
understanding of autonomy has been critiqued for its exclusion of people who 
do not fit the ideal mold of independent cognitively unimpaired agents.113 
Thus, it is not surprising that the legal test that derives from that value is 
                                                                                                                     
which are often the biggest driver of restrictive sexual environments for people with 
disabilities. 
 111 See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE 
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 36–40 (1990) (discussing the importance of self-
determination to informed consent); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and 
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1771–77 (1992) (discussing the role of 
autonomy in mental health law). 
 112 See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988) 
(understanding autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon 
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or 
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values”); FEINBERG, supra 
note 38, at 28 (describing autonomy as a capacity for self-government, which “is 
determined by the ability to make rational choices, a qualification usually so interpreted as 
to exclude infants, insane persons, the severely retarded, the senile, and the comatose, and 
to include virtually everyone else”). 
 113 See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, The Ethics of Care, Dependence, and Disability, 24 
RATIO JURIS. 49, 51 (2011) (“I want to suggest that an ethics that puts the autonomous 
individual at the forefront, that eclipses the importance of our dependence on one 
another, . . . is not one to be preferred in the construction of an ethics of inclusion . . . .”); 
see also MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS 30–55 (2003) (summarizing 
critiques of autonomy and suggesting a reconfiguration of the concept rather than a 
wholesale rejection). One possibility for such a reconfiguration is the concept of relational 
autonomy, explored infra Part III.B. 
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subject to a similar critique. This creates a need for a new normative basis for 
the doctrine that is inclusive of people with persistent cognitive 
impairments.114 
The practical source of the problem is the fact that the adult sexual 
incapacity doctrine is not calibrated for the variety of situations in which it is 
applied. These include both temporary transient incapacities like intoxication 
as well as persistent incapacities such as Down Syndrome and dementia. The 
decision-making contexts for persistent lifelong and persistent acquired 
incapacity are different, as they lack the quality of a reemerging self with 
mental capacity and often involve decision-making with the assistance of 
others. Any test of sexual incapacity that applies to these two contexts should 
take into account the lived experiences of people in those situations. 
This Part endeavors to address these theoretical and practical problems. 
Part A argues that the primary theoretical basis for sexual incapacity doctrines 
should be sexual capability, an inclusive alternative to sexual autonomy that 
still protects the historical importance of self-determination in the doctrine. 
Part B discusses the concept and practice of supported decision-making, the 
context in which many people with persistent cognitive impairments live their 
lives and practice self-determination. Understanding this lived experience 
generates the insight that self-determination, often cast as autonomy, is 
relational in nature. 
A. Sexual Capability 
The capabilities approach in economics and philosophy is a view of living 
as a combination of functionings, which are a series of “doings” and 
“beings.”115 These “doings” and “beings” are the various activities that one 
could engage in, or the various states of being that one could achieve.116 
Examples of doing functionings include voting in an election, taking care of a 
child, or eating a nutritious meal. Examples of being functionings are being 
healthy, being educated, or being happy. A capability represents the ability to 
pursue these functionings, and one’s global well-being is based on whether 
one can achieve functionings that are valuable, like sex and sexuality.117 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 
38 MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1205 (1940) (arguing for the importance of understanding the 
substantive policies that underlie capacity doctrine). 
 115 See Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 
270, 270–93 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3rd ed. 2008); see also AMARTYA SEN, 
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 25–32 (1985). 
 116 See SEN, supra note 17, at 39. 
 117 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78 (2000) 
(considering the capability to pursue “opportunities for sexual satisfaction” as one of the 
central human capabilities necessary for a flourishing life); SEN, supra note 17, at 40 
(“Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to 
lead one type of life or another.”). 
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I define the value of sexual capability as the opportunity to pursue 
functionings associated with sex and sexuality.118 This could include having 
sexual pleasure, forming a sexual identity, or feeling sexy. The opportunities 
to achieve such functionings are not unlimited. In particular, one must respect 
the sexual capabilities of others.119 This justifies the requirement of consent, as 
it preserves the ability of others to make their own sexual choices.120 Consent 
is also important because having sex without consent—i.e., experiencing 
rape—creates a host of other severely negative welfare effects, as the 
expansive literature on rape has documented.121 This can affect not only your 
own sexual capability but other human capabilities that are important.122 
The focus of sexual capability is on ensuring opportunities rather than on 
guaranteeing happiness, economic resources, or freedom from state 
interference.123 However, capability can overlap significantly with these other 
measures of well-being. For example, a society that socializes its citizens to 
think that sex is dirty, that criminalizes non-marital sexual conduct, and that 
provides no protections against sexual violence, denies its citizens the 
capability for a healthy sexual life. Its citizens may also be less likely to be 
                                                                                                                     
 118 While Nussbaum categorizes sexual satisfaction as a part of the fundamental 
capability of bodily integrity, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 117, at 78, it could also be a part 
of other fundamental capabilities, such as senses, imagination, and thought, emotions, 
practical reason, affiliation, and play. See id. at 78-80; see also DON KULICK & JENS 
RYDSTRÖM, LONELINESS AND ITS OPPOSITE 286 (2015) (connecting a right to sex with the 
fundamental capabilities of bodily integrity, emotions, and affiliation). 
 119 This is a key facet of liberal political theory. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 325–28 (1971). But see 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 107–62 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, Nazis, Skokie, 
and the First Amendment as Virtue, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 255 (1986) (“The progressive 
critique of classical, your-rights-end-at-my-nose liberalism is based precisely on the idea of 
social interdependence, and a vision of institutions that change continuously over time to 
provide individuals with increasingly greater rights and opportunities.”). 
 120 Consent is best understood as “both a subjective decision and a social act.” Emily 
Sherwin, Infelicitous Sex, 2 LEGAL THEORY 209, 216 (1996). This social act has great 
power, which derives from personhood. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 
2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996) (“[C]onsent can function to transform the morality of 
another’s conduct—to make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong. For 
example, consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft 
into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of 
name and likeness into a biography.”). 
 121 See, e.g., Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual 
Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225 (2009) 
(describing the long-term negative effects of rape); Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes 
Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 193 (1987–88) (describing rape as “negation 
of existence”); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) (comparing rape to “spiritual murder”).  
 122 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 76–78 (2006) (providing a list of ten central human capabilities). 
 123 See Sen, supra note 115, at 271. 
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happy. Even if society does provide all that is necessary for a healthy sexual 
life, individual members of that society might, however, still pursue unhealthy 
sexual relationships or deny themselves sexual partners altogether, despite the 
desire for them. In other words, they might not take advantage of the 
opportunities to which they have access. Ultimately, it is the right of each 
individual to decide whether to pursue the functionings that are within 
reach.124 Perhaps other functionings are perceived to be more important, or 
other commitments required sacrifices in the realm of sex and sexuality. In this 
way, sexual capability is agnostic as to peoples’ sexual choices, as the focus is 
on creating the ability to have meaningful choice.125 
This points to a minimum threshold of capacity that should be required by 
any legal test embodying sexual capability: the ability to express volition. In 
other words, if one is so cognitively impaired that one cannot express 
affirmative desire with respect to sexual opportunities, then one cannot be a 
sexual agent.126 This requirement of the ability to express will or intention 
represents a basic threshold that one must cross before one can be deemed 
capable of sexual consent.127 This is a relatively minimal threshold, but it is 
necessary, not only to establish sexual consent in the first place, but also 
because it the only way to know what a person’s internal mental states 
regarding sexual desires might be.128 
A given person’s capabilities are a “product of her internal endowments, 
her external resources, and the social and physical environment in which she 
lives.”129 For example, in order to have the ability to drive to work, one must 
possess physical and mental capacities to drive, the resources to buy a vehicle 
to transport oneself, the legal entitlement of a driver’s license, and adequately 
paved roads to get from point A to point B. This reflects the understanding that 
                                                                                                                     
 124 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 171–73. 
 125 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW 296–97 (2008) (“First, as 
a society, we accept the fact that persons without mental disabilities are free to make 
terrible decisions all the time without governmental or judicial intervention. . . . Yet, we 
have a different view with regard to the decision-making autonomy and capability of 
persons with mental disabilities. Why is that?” (footnote omitted)). 
 126 See Robert Audi, Volition, Intention, and Responsibility, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 
1680 (1994) (discussing the importance of volition as acts of will or as playing an 
“executory role in action”). 
 127 See Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 67 (2012) (noting that volition is one of the necessary 
components of consent). 
 128 See Donald Dripps, For a Negative, Normative Model of Consent, with a Comment 
on Preference-Skepticism, 2 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 (1996) (“[C]onsent, is, at least in 
part, either a psychological state or some conduct that is presumed to provide evidence of a 
psychological state.”); Drobac, supra note 110, at 80 (discussing the necessity of volition 
to both legal consent and assent). 
 129 Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in MEASURING 
JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 81, 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns 
eds., 2010). 
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capabilities are not just a product of cognitive factors.130 For example, sexual 
capability is the product of various factors, including one’s cognitive 
impairments, social resources, and the legal treatment of those impairments 
and resources. Disability theorists have long emphasized that disabilities are 
not only created by the physical or mental impairments of the individual, but 
also by a society that refuses to accommodate these impairments.131 Put 
another way, the source of disability should be located both externally and 
internally.132 
This is where the distinction between mental and legal capacity is helpful. 
The former represents the cognitive capacities of the subject, and the latter 
represents how the law interprets those capacities.133 To the extent that the law 
only considers mental capacities in evaluating legal capacity, it deprives many 
people with cognitive impairments of legal capacity. In the realm of sexuality, 
this has the effect of cutting people with persistent cognitive impairments off 
from this important aspect of the human experience. In other words, the legal 
doctrine can be a source of disability for people with cognitive impairments if 
it focuses narrowly on their mental capacities. 
Sexual capability overlaps significantly with the value of sexual autonomy 
in its emphasis on self-determination. Whereas autonomy focuses on 
possessing the cognitive faculties to make choice, capability is more focused 
on creating the conditions necessary for self-determination, both internal and 
external to the subject. This more holistic understanding of self-determination 
makes the value inclusive of people with persistent cognitive impairments, but 
it does not represent a huge departure from the traditional normative bases of 
the sexual incapacity doctrines. This maintains doctrinal coherence with the 
                                                                                                                     
 130 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 70–71 (2000) (describing the 
various heterogeneities in these different variables that contribute to overall capability). 
 131 See, e.g., MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 11 (1990); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J. 
SOC. PHIL. 105, 110 (1992) (“A handicap results from the interaction between a disability 
and an environment . . . .”). But see Anita Silvers, An Essay on Modeling: The Social 
Model of Disability, in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 19, 19–21 (D. 
Christopher Ralston & Justin Ho eds., 2010) (critiquing the social model of disability for 
not representing the subjective and varied nature of the lived experience of people with 
disabilities). 
 132 See Lennart Nordenfelt, Ability, Competence, and Qualification: Fundamental 
Concepts in the Philosophy of Disability, in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY, 
supra note 131, at 37, 39 (“Thus, there is no such thing as ability in isolation. And there is 
no such thing as an opportunity in isolation. A person’s ability must be judged in light of a 
certain set of circumstances. And a person’s opportunity must be judged in the light of a 
certain set of conditions internal to his or her body or mind.”). 
 133 See Charles P. Sabatino, Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions, in OLDER 
ADULTS’ DECISION-MAKING AND THE LAW 1, 2–4 (Michael Smyer et al. eds., 1996) 
(referring to legal capacity determinations as legal fictions). 
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interconnected legal regimes governing consent and sexual assault, which are 
premised to a large degree on the sexual autonomy value.134 
Like sexual autonomy, sexual capability is valuable not only because of 
the opportunity it represents to forge a sexual self, but also because it 
indirectly protects sexual welfare, or the effects of sex that contribute to well-
being.135 The welfare associated with sexual activity derives, first, from the 
subjective mental states that are involved in sex. These mental states are 
important because of the largely subjective nature of sex.136 The first sense in 
which sex is subjective is that what is actually “sexual” will differ wildly 
between people and contexts.137 Consider the recent controversy over the artist 
Sia’s music video for her song, “Elastic Heart.”138 In it, Shia LaBoeuf, a 28-
year old male actor, performs an interpretive dance shirtless with Maddie 
Ziegler, a 12-year old dancer, who wears a full-body nude-colored costume. 
Sia intended and saw the dance as nonsexual; it represented a battle between 
two “Sia self-states.”139 The outcry was immediate from fans, however, who 
considered the video to be sexualizing children and valorizing pedophilia, 
                                                                                                                     
 134 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[Rape] is 
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal 
integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of choosing those 
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 
‘ultimate violation of self.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS 1 (1975))); STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 99 (1998). There are, of course, dissenting voices. See 
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81–93 (1987) (arguing that systems of 
societal coercion render consent suspect); Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: 
Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 806 (1999) 
(arguing for sexual agency); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the 
Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1425–27 (2013) (arguing for self-
possession). 
 135 See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 111, at 9–36 (discussing the importance of 
the value of well-being to the analysis of incapacity); Larry Alexander, Pursuing the 
Good—Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 315 (1985) (discussing Mill’s views on the relationship 
between libertarianism and utilitarianism). 
 136 See ABRAMSON & PINKERTON, supra note 30, at 8–10 (describing the subjective 
nature of sexual pleasure); see also Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic 
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 
185 (2000). 
 137 See Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139, 1146–47 
(1998) (discussing whether the ritualized fellatio between Sambian males should be 
considered sexual or erotic); id. at 1157–58 (discussing whether the sodomy of Abner 
Louima by New York City police should be considered a sex crime). 
 138 Sia, Elastic Heart feat. Shia LaBeouf & Maddie Ziegler (Official Video), YOUTUBE 
(Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWZGAExj-es [http://perma.cc/ 
EB5B=J3M5]. 
 139 See Kory Grow, Sia Apologizes for Controversial ‘Elastic Heart’ Video with Shia 
Labeouf, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/sia-
apologizes-for-controversial-elastic-heart-video-with-shia-labeouf-20150108 [http://perma.cc/ 
ZCW2-2T46]. 
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given the identities of the two performers and the juxtaposition of their bodies 
in a certain configuration.140 What is sexual for one person might not be 
sexual for another. 
Sex is also highly subjective in a second sense. Even when there is 
consensus about what is considered sexual, two people might disagree about 
whether some activity deemed sexual is desirable.141 This is the case with 
respect to sexual partners—neither a heterosexual male nor a lesbian will 
likely find sex with a male desirable. This is also the case with respect to 
sexual activities. Some people get off on being sexual exhibitionists, while 
others find the thought terrifying. Even within individuals, there may be a mix 
of emotions and desires with respect to a given sexual activity with a given 
partner.142 Thus, from an outside perspective, there is no clear and objective 
way to determine what is “good sex” and “bad sex.” Delegating sexual 
decisions to the individual represents the understanding that the individual is 
in the best position to perform their own sexual welfare calculus.143 
While sexual welfare might primarily be subjective, this subjectivity 
breaks down somewhat when we think of the physical consequences of sex. 
There are certain physical effects of sexual decisions, such as pregnancy and 
sexually transmitted diseases, which are knowable to third parties and 
quantifiable by medical professionals. These physical effects are also strongly 
related to other fundamental human capabilities such as life and bodily 
health.144 Health occupies a special place in the capabilities framework, which 
warrants special attention to the health-related consequences of sexual 
expression.145 The interpretation of these physical effects may still vary—
                                                                                                                     
 140 See id. 
 141 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 7 (1999) (“Having an ethics 
of sex, therefore, does not mean having a theory about what people’s desires are or should 
be. If the goal is sexual autonomy, then it will be impossible to say in advance what form 
that will take.”); see also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 25–26 
(2008) (noting the various and radical ways in which sexuality differs in its subjective 
meaning for individuals). 
 142 See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 301–02 (2006) (“I think most of us experience sex (when it’s not routinized) as 
an alarming mix of desire and fear, delight and disgust, power and surrender, surrender and 
power, attachment and alienation, ecstasy in the root sense of the word and enmired 
embodiedness.”). 
 143 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55 (David Spitz, ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1975) (1859) (“But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the 
maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to 
find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances 
and character.”). 
 144 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 76 (“1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a 
human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to 
be not worth living. 2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”). 
 145 See CHRISTOPHER A. RIDDLE, DISABILITY AND JUSTICE 77–85 (2014) (arguing for 
the primacy of health in the ordering of capabilities). 
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imagine the contrasting reactions to an unwanted pregnancy and a pregnancy 
that results from several months of actively seeking that result. However, in 
situations of mental incapacity, there might be no clear understanding or 
interpretation of these physical effects from the individual with cognitive 
impairments. In these cases, there may be a role for third-party evaluation of 
such risks to protect the individual from welfare threats.146 
The third parties most likely to assist people with persistent cognitive 
impairments in their decision-making are their supportive networks. The next 
Part explores how many people with disabilities live in these capability-
enhancing networks, which are unrecognized by the law in this area. 
B. Supported Decision-Making and Relational Autonomy 
Social supports play an important role in enabling people with cognitive 
impairments to exercise decision-making. In particular, people with persistent 
cognitive impairments can and often do exercise decision-making potential 
through supportive decision-making networks.147 Supported decision-making 
is an emerging concept and formal practice, characterized by a situation in 
which “an individual with cognitive challenges is the ultimate decision-maker 
but is provided support from one or more persons who explain issues to the 
individual and, where necessary, interpret the individual’s words and behavior 
to determine his or her preferences.”148 
These networks can consist of a single caregiver, a set of family members, 
or an institution’s staff. The type of support provided will vary in accordance 
with the impairments the network is helping address. First, there are supports 
that “assist in formulating one’s purposes, to explore the range of choices and 
to make a decision.”149 This involves communicating with the individual with 
cognitive impairments to discern what her sexual desires are and helping her 
make the connections between those interests and potential choices. If the 
person lacks the ability to communicate verbally, then this may involve 
observing the individual in context and paying attention to subtle cues of 
desire or displeasure.150 
                                                                                                                     
 146 Such third-party evaluation of welfare threats might also be warranted for certain 
types of social consequences as well, if the subject cannot logically connect her actions to 
such consequences, but will still profoundly feel their effects. 
 147 See Sara Honn Qualls, Decision-Making Capacity: The Players, in CHANGES IN 
DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY IN OLDER ADULTS, supra note 37, at 109, 109–18 (describing 
the different “players” that assist in decision-making). 
 148 Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to 
Guardianship?, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2013). 
 149 MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY 
AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 73 (Oct. 2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/ 
disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf [http://perma.cc/TL55-68JM]. 
 150 See Stanley S. Herr, Self-Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for 
Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: 
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 429, 431–35 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (describing the 
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Second, there are “supports to engage in the decision-making process with 
other parties.”151 This primarily involves communicative support, as people 
with cognitive impairments may have special forms of communicating their 
desires and concerns. Research on people with profound disabilities has shown 
that they are often capable of communication with the assistance of partners 
who know them and their methods well.152 Such persons can act as 
interpreters, just as a foreign language interpreter would for others.153 
Third, there are “supports to act on the decisions that one has made.”154 
This involves actualizing the decision, which may require arrangements for the 
sexual expression in question. This could include creating a safe space to 
engage in sexual expression, ensuring that the person with cognitive 
impairment is not at risk for physical harm. It may also require the creation of 
a private space for sexual expression, to the extent possible without 
compromising the physical safety of the person with cognitive impairments.155 
Supported decision-making broadens our understanding of the decision-
making apparatus and of personhood from the individual and her body to the 
individual nested in a series of relationships that facilitate meaningful 
decision-making and flourishing.156 It is also a recognition and exercise of 
relational autonomy.157 As several feminist theorists have pointed out, our 
                                                                                                                     
system in Sweden, which appoints a “god man,” who acts as an assistant to the person with 
disabilities); Israel Doron, Elder Guardianship Kaleidoscope—A Comparative Legal 
Perspective, 16 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 368, 376 (2002) (describing the “hojonin,” or 
helper, in Japan for those who suffer from milder forms of intellectual disability, and with 
whom various decisions are jointly made with the ward). 
 151 See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 149, at 73. 
 152 See STEVEN CARNABY, PEOPLE WITH PROFOUND AND MULTIPLE LEARNING 
DISABILITIES: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ABOUT THEIR LIVES 9–10 (2004) (summarizing the 
approaches and results of several studies); see also MALCOLM GOLDSMITH, HEARING THE 
VOICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA 56–59 (1996) (discussing communication strategies for 
individuals with dementia); Karen Bunning, Making Sense of Communication, in 
PROFOUND INTELLECTUAL AND MULTIPLE DISABILITIES: NURSING COMPLEX NEEDS 46, 46 
(Jillian Pawlyn & Steven Carnaby eds., 2009). 
 153 See, e.g., Nancy M. Maurer, Facilitated Communication: Can Children with Autism 
Have a Voice in Court?, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 233, 248 (1995) (exploring the 
legal issues involved in facilitated communication for people with autism). 
 154 See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 149, at 73. 
 155 See Kristine S. Knaplund, The Right of Privacy and America’s Aging Population, 
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2009) (discussing the tension between sexual expression 
and privacy). 
 156 See KULICK & RYDSTRÖM, supra note 118, at 16 (“If I need other people’s 
assistance to eat, dress, make lunch, scratch my itchy nose, convey meaning through my 
monosyllabic vocalizations, and engage in sexual relations with my equally disabled 
partner, then the locus of my personhood is dispersed—it resides not in my body, but 
across a network of relations that need to get coordinated in order to allow me to flourish as 
an individual.”). 
 157 See Marilyn Friedman, Relational Autonomy and Independence, in AUTONOMY, 
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 42, 42 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (defining 
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sense of self and autonomy is experienced and interpreted relationally.158 As 
children, we construct a sense of self in relation to our parents or other loved 
ones who might surround us.159 They help us to develop our capacities for 
individuality and choice, and this process continues as we age. Consider the 
example of student autonomy in a classroom. How a teacher structures a 
classroom impacts that autonomy, including the capacity for critical thinking: 
Classes can be structured so that students are expected to memorize material 
from lectures and texts and to parrot back professors’ views on exams. Class 
discussion can encourage respectful disagreement among students and with 
the professor or it can be characterized by harsh criticism or failure to take 
alternative views seriously. . . . Again, the power hierarchy (and the students’ 
dependence on the professor for grades) remains. The question is whether it is 
structured to create relations conducive to autonomy.160 
Thus, our social relationships can enhance the exercise of our autonomy or 
hinder it. We may enter the classroom with a set of mental capacities that will 
either thrive or wither, depending on the social environment. This basic 
dynamic is true of people with cognitive impairments as well, whose more 
limited cognitive capacities will either thrive or wither depending on the 
circumstances. 
Thus, we must rely on others to exercise our autonomy. This dependency, 
however, can come in two different forms. Some degree of dependency is a 
necessary feature of the human condition.161 For example, as children, 
everyone has undeveloped capacities for rational thought that must be 
nurtured, and everyone is at risk of becoming disabled, whether by accident or 
disease. Some amount of dependency, however, is “rooted in unjust and 
potentially remediable social institutions.”162 This type of surplus dependency 
                                                                                                                     
relational autonomy as “emphasizing the social nature of the self and the social relations 
and conditions that are necessary for the realization of autonomy”). 
 158 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 3 (2011) (“The individual self is, then, constituted in an ongoing, 
dynamic way by the relationships through which each person interacts with others.”); 
Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL 
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 3, 3–
31 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (summarizing the different feminist 
critiques of autonomy while arguing for a reconfiguration, rather than abandonment, of the 
concept for feminist theory). 
 159 See Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 317, 329–32 (2007) (describing identity formation among children). 
 160 See NEDELSKY, supra note 158, at 40. 
 161 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 18 (2000) (“All 
of us were dependent as children, and many of us will be dependent as we age, become ill, 
or suffer disabilities.”). 
 162 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “Dependency” Demystified: Inscriptions of Power 
in a Keyword of the Welfare State, 1 SOC. POL. 4, 24 (1994). 
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inhibits capability, and often is the result of unjust laws or allocations of 
resources. Fortunately, it is likewise amenable to reform through legal or 
policy interventions. 
In order for the adult sexual incapacity doctrine to realize the possibility of 
sexual capability, it must recognize the existence of supportive decision-
making networks.163 The law should recognize an individual who employs a 
supported decision-making network as having legal capacity on par with 
individuals who do not need such support.164 This will serve to remove one of 
the disabling features of the social environment for people with disabilities, 
and it will have the added benefit of bringing the law in line with international 
law norms in this area.165 
    
This Part first identified the sources of the problems with the dominant 
approach to adult sexual incapacity doctrine. The first problem is a theoretical 
one, as current doctrine rests on a narrow understanding of self-determination 
embodied by a non-relational autonomy value. The second problem is a 
practical one, as current doctrine does not take account of the decision-making 
structures of people with persistent cognitive impairments. The Part then 
proceeded to provide a stronger normative basis for sexual incapacity 
doctrine—sexual capability—which accounts for the internal as well as 
                                                                                                                     
 163 See Terry Carney, Participation and Service Access Rights for People with 
Intellectual Disability: A Role for Law?, 38 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 59, 
60 (2013) (noting that these structures already exist, waiting to be recognized by the law); 
Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and Appropriate 
Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 307 (2011). 
 164 See Nandini Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal Autonomy for 
Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 800–03 (2013) (describing more 
generally the range of decision-making statuses that people with disabilities could occupy). 
 165 See U.N. Secretary-General, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 6, 
2006), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N06/645/30/PDF/N0664530.pdf? 
OpenElement [http://perma.cc/X8MD-2EBJ] (“States Parties shall recognize that persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”); 
Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from 
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 8 (2012) (suggesting 
a move to supported decision-making may be necessary); Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-
Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 124 (2014) (arguing that only supported decision-making models are 
permissible under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 12). 
But see Sheila Wildeman, Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of the 
Conventions on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 48, 58 
(2013) (describing CRPD Article 12 as a skeletal attack on the existing regime of capacity, 
without necessarily having plausible alternatives yet). 
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external threats to self-determination. It then went on to discuss the role of 
supportive networks in assisting those with persistent cognitive impairments in 
pursuing decision-making, reflecting the relational nature of autonomy. The 
next Part operationalizes the insights of this Part, describing what an adult 
sexual incapacity doctrine informed by these insights might look like. 
IV. COGNITION-PLUS 
The cognition-plus test represents the legal implementation of the sexual 
capability value for people with persistent cognitive impairments. It derives its 
name from a joint focus on the mental capacities of the subject (cognition) and 
the recognition that some individuals achieve sexual decision-making capacity 
through the assistance of a decision-making support network (plus). The test 
proceeds in three general steps. The first step is to gauge whether the 
individual has the threshold capacity to express volition with respect to a 
sexual decision. Without this manifestation of desire, one cannot proceed to be 
a sexual agent. If the first step is satisfied, the second step is to assess whether 
the individual has the necessary mental capacities to understand and reason 
about the nature and consequences of a given sexual decision. If one meets this 
requirement, then one has sexual consent capacity without the need for 
assistance. If one does not, however, the third step is to evaluate whether there 
is an adequate decision-making support network in place. Assessment of the 
system would be contextual in nature, guided by the principles of loyalty and 
care from fiduciary law. Thus, courts would evaluate whether the system is 
free from conflicts of interest, has adequate knowledge of the individual and 
the sexual decision, and has taken reasonable steps to protect the individual 
with cognitive impairments from the threat of sexually transmitted diseases 
and pregnancy. If the system is adequate, then the individual possesses sexual 
consent capacity. 
Part A discusses the key features of the test, compares it to the other 
approaches discussed in Part II, and notes its limitations. Part B applies the test 
to the case of older people with dementia, a group that has received little 
attention in legal scholarship. 
A. The Cognition-Plus Test 
1. The Three-Step Legal Test 
The first step of the cognition-plus test is to examine whether an 
individual with persistent cognitive impairments still has the capacity to 
express volition. This volition is traditionally expressed as verbally saying 
“Yes” to sex. People with cognitive impairments, however, may have 
difficulty with standard communication. In this case, volition might be inferred 
in a variety of ways, which will often be specific to the person. It might come 
in the form of initiation and active pursuit of sexual expression. Alternatively, 
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it might require an interpretation of cues by someone familiar with the 
person’s communication methods, which could include nonverbal signals or 
facial expressions.166 If one is not capable of even this basic level of 
communication of volition, then one lacks the legal capacity for sexual 
consent. In this case, liability should flow to her sexual partner or to 
institutions that have a responsibility for safeguarding her. 
The second step is to assess the variety of cognitive abilities that one 
might need to reason about a given sexual decision and its consequences. At a 
minimum, this requires an understanding that the person has the power to 
make a choice, to consent or not. Beyond this, the capacity to understand and 
judge consequences is necessary to perform a subjective welfare calculus for 
oneself. Thus, at an abstract level, the set of consequences of sex that one 
should have the capacity to understand should start large, encompassing both 
its physical and nonphysical effects. This starting point is justified by the fact 
that sex has many meanings and many effects, any of which might be relevant 
to a given decision-maker. One might want to achieve pleasure with sex, forge 
a specific identity, solidify social relationships with others, or all of the 
above.167 
This relatively large set of consequences must then be calibrated to the 
particular sexual situation. In other words, because capacity is determined on a 
functional basis, one must consider each sexual decision at a particular point in 
time under a particular set of circumstances. Physical and nonphysical 
consequences vary significantly with sexual behavior; thus, the type and 
quantity of consequences that one must be capable of understanding should 
vary as well. For example, holding hands and kissing do not involve 
significant risks of negative physical consequences, while penile-vaginal 
                                                                                                                     
 166 See, e.g., People v. Miranda, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 339 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A person 
can have the ability to give consent even though he or she responds to questions with one 
or two-word answers and with physical gestures.”). 
 167 This set of consequences, however, should not include the “moral” consequences of 
sex, as required by the New York test. First, it is not clear that there is a consensus on the 
moral quality of different sexual acts in society, making a determination of that consensus 
an impossible cognitive task. Some states have rejected the morality test precisely because 
of this vagueness problem. See State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa 1980) 
(striking down as unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring “the mental capacity to know 
the right and wrong of conduct in sexual matters”). Second, since sexual activities are often 
more private than other activities, the moral views of society as a whole would not be a 
relevant consequence for most individuals engaged in sexual relations. See Anderson v. 
Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1043 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the state 
surely has a very strong, legitimate interest in ensuring that the consent of a mentally 
disabled individual is knowledgeable and truly voluntary, and in disregarding that consent 
in situations where the alleged victim does not understand either the circumstances and 
consequences of sexual conduct or the extent of her ability to refuse sex, the state has no 
legitimate interest in imposing sexual mores on retarded individuals or their consensual 
partners.”). Moral disapproval by others might be a relevant social consequence of sexual 
activity that one might have to have the capacity to understand at some level, if one would 
actually experience welfare effects from others’ moral disapproval. 
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intercourse poses more significant risks of pregnancy or sexually transmitted 
diseases. Since there are more consequences at issue, the latter will likely 
require a higher level of cognitive capacities than the former.168 In sum, the 
context of the sexual encounter must be examined to determine which 
consequences are actually present for a given sexual decision-maker. 
If a person with persistent cognitive impairments does not have the 
requisite mental capacities alone to reason about a specific sexual decision and 
its consequences, then the court must proceed to the third step and broaden the 
inquiry to determine if an adequate decision-making support system is in 
place. This support system can take many forms, including friends, family, or 
institutional staff. The network will often include people who have been 
legally appointed to make decisions for a person with cognitive impairments, 
such as a guardian or attorney-in-fact.169 That legal authorization to act as a 
surrogate decision-maker, however, is not sufficient to establish that a valid 
decision-making support system is in place.170 In other words, a decision-
making support system does not exist to make the sexual decision as a 
surrogate for the person with cognitive impairments, but instead to facilitate 
her wishes and desires. 
                                                                                                                     
 168 This is in some respects similar to the risk-relativity approach in health care 
decision-making. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 111, at 51–57. In assessing 
capacity, its proponents argue, one must consider the probabilities of benefit and harm 
from a given health care treatment, considering the alternatives. The more risky the course 
of action, the higher the level of capacity required to engage in it. This creates an 
asymmetrical set of capacity requirements—one for accepting a known beneficial 
treatment (low), and one for refusing said treatment (high). Id. The approach here is 
different in that it would not weight positive and negative consequences differently; the 
presence of either would raise the required level of capacity. Thus, the cognition-plus test 
avoids some of the critiques of the risk-relativity approach. See, e.g., David Checkland, On 
Risk and Decisional Capacity, 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 35, 36 (2001) (criticizing the 
asymmetrical nature of the test as confusing the capacity question and the well-being 
question). But see Ian Wilks, Asymmetrical Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 154, 158–59 (1999) 
(defending asymmetrical capacity). Avoiding asymmetry makes sense in the sexual domain 
because of the subjectivity of sex. Ex ante, it is difficult both to predict the mental and 
social consequences of sexual activity and to know whether any sexual consequence will 
be experienced positively or negatively. This, in turn, makes it impossible to create a 
repository of sexual knowledge akin to the repository of medical knowledge about the 
likely trajectories of treatment. 
 169 See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION-
MAKING 171–82 (2006) (describing the process of appointing a guardian or selecting an 
attorney-in-fact). 
 170 This is especially true in the United States, with its reliance on plenary 
guardianship and its under-use of more tailored guardianship. See Lawrence A. Frolik, 
Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
347, 348–50 (1998) (noting how statutory changes in limited guardianships have not led to 
their widespread adoptions). In other countries, supported decision-making principles are 
embedded in the law. See, e.g., Makoto Arai, Guardianship in Japan Under the Adult 
Guardianship Law of 2000, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT GUARDIANSHIP 
167, 170–71 (A. Kimberley Dayton ed., 2014). 
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It is possible that there will be many individuals who are potential 
members of the decision-making support system, and they might disagree on 
how best to actualize the sexual desires of a person with cognitive 
impairments. Ideally, such disagreements will be worked out before the sexual 
activity takes place. However, it is not the role of the court to determine the 
one true decision-making support system. This is the case for two reasons. 
First, this shifts the focus from the person with cognitive impairments to those 
around her, but it is the person with cognitive impairments whose desires and 
volition should be the focus of the analysis.171 To the extent that she is aided 
in actualizing those desires by a supportive network, the court’s only task is to 
determine whether that particular network was adequate. Thus, this approach 
implicitly favors the supportive network that wishes to actualize the wishes of 
the person with impairments, centering the analysis on that person. 
Second, as a practical matter, the court need not decide between two 
supportive networks that have different opinions about which sexual choice is 
best. As it would be deciding the case ex post in a civil or criminal proceeding, 
it need only analyze whether the supportive network or portion of the network 
that facilitated the sexual relations in question was adequate under the criteria 
discussed in this Part. In other words, it need not resolve the dispute of who 
represents the “better” network in a more general sense, as the presence of 
some other potential supportive network would not be relevant to determining 
whether the operative network was actually adequate.172 
Whatever individuals comprise the decision-making support system, that 
support system must also participate in the making of the relevant sexual 
decision in order to prevent liability from flowing to sexual partners or 
supervising institutions. For example, consider the following case in which a 
support network existed but was not involved in the decision.173 On February 
20, 2011, a twenty-six year old woman with moderate intellectual disabilities 
was left alone in her mother’s apartment. While highly sociable, her reasoning 
and communication skills were significantly impaired. Her caregiver did not 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for 
the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541, 1547–49 (describing a person-centered philosophy in 
the context of guardianship). 
 172 A court might have to make this determination in other types of proceedings, such 
as guardianship. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2010) (noting that the right 
to “make decisions about his or her social environment or other social aspects of his or her 
life” might be removed from a person and given to a guardian). The degree to which a 
guardian could legally limit a ward’s “social environment” could not be absolute, given 
mandates that guardianship be adopted in its least restrictive form. See, e.g., id. § 744.344 
(“The order appointing a guardian must be consistent with the incapacitated person’s 
welfare and safety, must be the least restrictive appropriate alternative, and must reserve to 
the incapacitated person the right to make decisions in all matters commensurate with the 
person’s ability to do so.”). Of course, in practice, some guardians may exert such 
influence in spite of the law’s mandates. 
 173 This narrative is adapted from State v. Inzunza, 316 P.3d 1266, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
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show up that day, and so she left her mother’s apartment and wandered into 
the open door of Miguel Inzunza’s apartment, also in the apartment complex. 
While there, she did not say anything, but she did eat a plate of food Miguel 
gave her, watched television, listened to music, and followed Miguel into his 
bedroom. At 2 a.m. the next morning, the police found them asleep together on 
Miguel’s bed. She had hickeys on her neck and breast, Miguel’s DNA was 
found on her breast, and her DNA was found on his penis. Miguel claimed that 
the sexual activity was consensual. 
In this example, the young woman was disconnected from her caregivers 
as she wandered into a stranger’s apartment. While a support network might 
have existed for her in another context, it was not supporting her decision to 
engage in sexual activity with Miguel Inzunza. A person lacking a network at 
the time of the sexual decision must be assessed according to the mental 
capacities she has alone. If these are insufficient, liability must flow to her 
sexual partner and the institution with a responsibility for taking care of her. It 
is important to note that involvement of a network in supporting sexual 
decision-making by a person with persistent cognitive impairments does not 
mean that members of the supportive network necessarily need to be 
physically present for the sexual acts. For some severely disabled individuals, 
this may be the case, and there is a tradeoff between privacy and sexual 
expression in these situations. For most others, involvement of the supportive 
network may require something more like appropriate sex education, provision 
of contraception, and vetting of the sexual partner in question.174 
After verifying the involvement of a decision-making support system, the 
court should assess its quality to ensure that it is adequate. This is essentially 
an inquiry into the health of the decision-making apparatus as a whole, similar 
to the inquiry into the individual’s mental capacities. The principles governing 
fiduciary relationships provide useful guideposts for conducting this fact-
intensive and contextual inquiry. A fiduciary is an individual who is in a 
position of power and trust with respect to another person, putting that other 
person at risk if the fiduciary does not act in her interests.175 Members of the 
decision-making support system are in this type of relationship with the person 
with cognitive impairments, who relies on them to assist in decision-making 
tasks.176 
                                                                                                                     
 174 See, e.g., KULICK & RYDSTRÖM, supra note 118, at 106–12 (discussing the role of 
contracts, group discussions, and roleplays in structuring the sexual education and sexual 
activities of people with cognitive impairments); id. at 200–05 (discussing how Danish 
“sexual advisors” assist people with persistent cognitive impairments with engaging sex 
workers). 
 175 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011) (“While the definitions of 
fiduciaries are not identical, all definitions share three main elements: (1) entrustment of 
property or power, (2) entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk to the entrustors 
emanating from the entrustment.”). 
 176 This is not to say that the decision-making support system should necessarily be 
considered a fiduciary entity under law, but instead to suggest that fiduciary principles are 
helpful for determining whether the decision-making support system is adequate to the 
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Because of their position of power and trust, fiduciaries have certain 
duties.177 The primary fiduciary duty is one of loyalty: the duty to act in the 
interests of the person for whom you are a fiduciary.178 This primarily means 
avoiding conflicts of interest.179 In application to the sexual realm, this 
suggests that courts should be skeptical of members of a supportive network 
who are also engaging in sexual expressions with the person who has cognitive 
impairments. This indicates a conflict of interest that could potentially reflect 
that the sexual decisions being made do not reflect the preferences of the 
person with cognitive impairments. 
The no-further-inquiry rule traditionally governs such situations.180 Under 
it, a fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-dealing, even if these 
conflicted transactions are well-meaning.181 Applied in this context, such a 
rule would have the effect of deeming conflicted supportive networks per se 
inadequate, imposing civil or criminal liability on all sexual partners who were 
also members of the decision-making support network. 
Such a harsh rule and outcome is unwarranted in this context. Members of 
the decision-making support system will often be spouses or other loved ones, 
who may be primary targets of sexual interest by the person with cognitive 
impairments.182 To rule out all sexual encounters with members of supportive 
networks may restrict the desirable sexual options of people with cognitive 
impairments completely. At the same time, conflicted networks should not get 
a pass; they should be subjected to a rebuttable presumption of network 
inadequacy, which can be overcome if sufficient evidence of loyalty and care 
                                                                                                                     
task. Legal scholars have applied similar principles to other noneconomic relationships. 
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2401, 2401–02 (1995). 
 177 There are several different theories justifying the imposition of these fiduciary 
duties. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045–49 (1991) 
(performing a law and economics analysis of fiduciary relationships); Deborah A. DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 908–15 
(discussing voluntary assumption, entrusting, and descriptive theories). 
 178 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent 
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with 
the agency relationship.”). 
 179 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Counsel’s function is to 
assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest.”). 
 180 See, e.g., Wood v. McDonald, 124 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Mass. 1955); Hartmann v. 
Hartle, 122 A. 615, 615 (N.J. Ch. 1928). 
 181 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“[T]he trustee 
is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that 
otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal 
interests.”). 
 182 See MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIPS OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE, 
AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY 73 (2005) (noting that nearly seventy percent of guardians are 
family members). 
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is supplied to the court. This is consistent with recent scholarly commentary 
suggesting a move away from the no-further-inquiry rule for traditional 
fiduciary relationships.183 It is also a recognition that one conception of loyalty 
may not be appropriate for all types of fiduciary relationships, especially in 
domains such as this one, which contain a high frequency of structural 
conflicts of interest.184 
For the duty of loyalty, the goal in sifting through the evidence is to 
ascertain whether members of the supportive network have tried to avoid 
conflicts and whether they have adopted an orientation of selflessness towards 
the person with cognitive impairments at the center of the network.185 The 
evidence would be particularly important to overcome the presumption of 
network inadequacy in situations of conflicts of interest. One valuable type of 
evidence would be whether the person with cognitive impairments put trust in 
the loyalty of individuals who might be in the supportive network. This could 
include her acceptance of an individual as a marital partner or her appointment 
of someone as an agent for decision-making through a health care or financial 
durable power of attorney.186 Other evidence might be testimonial or 
documentary in nature, indicating whether or not the person was acting in a 
trustworthy and loyal way towards the person with cognitive impairments.187 
                                                                                                                     
 183 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or 
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 980–82 (2005) (describing such a rule). But see 
generally Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to 
Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 543 (2005). 
 184 See Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 176, 191 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
(“Different types of relationship [sic] may implicate different types of trust, as we see for 
example when we compare director–shareholder relationships, employer–employee 
relationships, parent–child relationships, or husband–wife relationships.”); Langbein, supra 
note 183, at 935–37 (describing how the pervasiveness of conflicts of interest may justify 
the switch to a best interests rule). 
 185 See Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 125, 139–40 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 
2014) (“In this thin sense of loyalty, the duty to be loyal embodies a ‘juridical’ moral duty, 
ie, [sic] a duty to act in a certain way which can be legitimately enforced by the state. The 
other ‘thick’ sense of loyalty implies a specific emotional and intellectual orientation 
towards one’s principals. It is an attitude in which selfless action comes easily, and 
exploitation of weakness is unthinkable.”). 
 186 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 
1267 (2013) (“Such advance planning is desirable because the principal is in the best 
position to select a trustworthy agent who is knowledgeable about the principal’s beliefs 
and preferences.”). This is not to say that spouses, health care proxy agents, or attorneys-
in-fact will always act loyally, but that the person who selected them has already put her 
trust in them, which is significant. 
 187 See Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 491, 494 (1988) (“Direct evidence is either documentary . . . or first-hand 
testimony of a person who actually perceived, through one or more of the senses, the 
disputed historical fact.”). 
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The other primary duty is one of care. The decision-making support 
system should “perform their services with prudence, attention, and 
proficiency.”188 This requires knowing the subject they are assisting and 
providing a safe space for the actualization of sexual desire. In this context, 
due care involves having information about the person’s history, preferences, 
and forms of communication. Thus, evidence of care could include the degree 
of familiarity with the subject and the amount of time that members of the 
supportive network have known her, assuming that knowledge was put to good 
use. Sufficient care ensures that the supportive network can actualize the 
subjective elements of the sexual experience for the person with cognitive 
impairments. For an institution, an inquiry into the level of care should seek to 
determine whether it performed a thorough analysis of the resident’s capacity, 
whether it gathered information about the resident’s history, preferences, and 
forms of communication, and whether it kept adequate records of these efforts 
to be reviewed by the court if necessary.189 
In addition to acquiring and operationalizing knowledge about the 
individual, care also involves providing a safe space for sexual expression to 
take place and taking reasonable steps to protect the individual with cognitive 
impairments from physical harm. This guarantees that the supportive network 
has recognized and dealt with the consequences of sex that entail more 
objective welfare threats, such as sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted 
pregnancy. Evidence of care with respect to these objective welfare effects 
could include efforts to enact various consequence-diminishing interventions, 
such as birth control to protect against pregnancy or Truvada to protect against 
HIV infection.190 Supportive networks can take precautions with respect to the 
physical environment as well, to prevent risk of fall or physical injury during 
sexual activity.191 In sum, the evidentiary inquiry on the care axis would focus 
on whether members of the supportive network have acted as a reasonable or 
prudent person or institution would have.192 
                                                                                                                     
 188 FRANKEL, supra note 175, at 169. 
 189 See Fay Rozovksy, Informed Consent as a Loss Control Process, in 2 RISK 
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 77, 92–97 (Sylvia M. Brown ed.) (describing 
the importance of these types of procedures in the context of informed consent generally). 
 190 See State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc) 
(describing how the mother of the person with cognitive impairments put her daughter on 
Depo-Provera, a form of birth control); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Are We Ready for H.I.V.’s 
Sexual Revolution?, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/24/opinion/sunday/ready-for-hivs-sexual-revolution.html [http://perma.cc/24ZJ-
LV3N] (describing the use of Truvada by many gay men as an effective pre-exposure 
prophylactic against HIV infection). 
 191 See Marshall B. Kapp, Resident Safety and Medical Errors in Nursing Homes 
Reporting and Disclosure in a Culture of Mutual Distrust, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 59–60 
(2003) (discussing the problem of falls in nursing homes). 
 192 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1039, 1043 (2011) (“The duty of care prescribes the fiduciary’s standard of care by 
establishing a ‘reasonableness’ or ‘prudence’ standard in which the meaning of 
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This is a familiar standard for institutions, and it provides them with more 
certainty and predictability in dealing with resident sexuality and the liability it 
might create. The current highly restrictive sexual policies are the result of a 
rational risk management strategy focused on exposure avoidance.193 The 
strategy is rational because it is a response to a legal regime that would impose 
liability for allowing any sexual activity by people with persistent cognitive 
impairments. In contrast, the cognition-plus test provides a clear route for 
supportive networks, particularly institutions, to avoid unnecessary legal 
liability. They only need to pursue adequate procedures that are consistent 
with the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, such as thorough assessment, 
provision of safety in sexual spaces, and recordkeeping. 
In other words, by treating sexual expression similarly to other issues that 
are already routinely managed, such as falls, pressure ulcers, or medical 
treatment, institutions can move away from an exposure avoidance strategy 
and towards a loss prevention or loss reduction strategy that might currently 
apply in those other areas.194 This is not to say that all institutions will always 
do this; many fail in these other areas so it would be surprising if there were no 
failures in this domain as well. In that case, liability will continue to flow, but 
institutions now at least have a route towards reducing liability exposure. 
Having reviewed the types of evidence that would be relevant to the 
capacity analysis, it is important to note the types of evidence that would not 
be relevant in a cognition-plus test. Certain facts that are integral to the sexual 
encounter would not be per se relevant to the capacity analysis. Examples 
include the sex of a subject’s sexual partner or the particular sex act engaged 
in with said partner. Similarly, other contextual facts that could trigger moral 
evaluation of the sexual situation, such as whether the person with cognitive 
impairments is engaging in adultery, or whether the motives of the sexual 
partner are benign, would likewise be irrelevant to the capacity analysis unless 
some specific link to a relevant step of the cognition-plus test could be 
established. 
There are at least two plausible routes to relevance. First, it is possible for 
such facts to enter the inquiry in a limited way in step two of the cognition-
plus test. This step requires assessing the relevant consequences of a particular 
sexual decision, as those consequences will dictate the level of mental 
capacities needed to process them. For example, the sex of the partner coupled 
with particular sexual acts may create the risk of a pregnancy consequence. Or 
                                                                                                                     
reasonableness or prudence is informed by industry norms and practices. This standard of 
care is objective, measured by reference to a reasonable or prudent person in like 
circumstances.”). 
 193 See Glenn T. Troyer & Leeanne R. Coons, Corporate Compliance: A Risk 
Management Framework, in 3 RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 123, 140 
(describing this strategy). 
 194 See Andrew Weinberg, Risk Management and Quality-of-Care Concerns in Long-
Term Care, in 7 ETHICS, LAW, AND AGING REVIEW 101, 102–03 (Marshall B. Kapp ed., 
2001). 
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the fact that the sex is adulterous may create the risk of fracturing an important 
relationship with a spouse-caregiver. Thus, these types of facts may enter the 
analysis because they affect the relevant consequences that one must have the 
capacity to consider. 
Second, certain facts could be relevant in step three of the cognition-plus 
test, which requires a deeper assessment of the loyalty of members of the 
supportive network in situations of conflict of interest. Thus, the motives of a 
conflicted member of supportive network could be relevant to the loyalty 
inquiry. In short, these types of facts only enter the analysis in a limited way 
for purposes of analyzing consequences or network adequacy, rather than for 
purposes of moral judgment. This excludes normative judgments about sex 
from the formal analysis of capacity in the legal test, and thus permits people 
with persistent cognitive impairments to pursue the wide range of sexual 
relationships and practices that those without impairments are entitled to 
pursue. For this reason, the cognition-plus test is at least nominally “sex-
positive.”195 
2. Comparisons with Existing Approaches 
To understand how the cognition-plus test differs from other approaches to 
sexual consent capacity, it is worth considering the points of convergence and 
divergence among the tests. First, there is the nature of the conduct test, which 
focuses on volition. Whereas this is the beginning and end of the analysis for 
this test, it only represents the beginning for the cognition-plus test. For simple 
expressions of sexuality that have few or no consequences, such as holding 
hands, the two tests will converge. The nature of the conduct test only requires 
volition, and the cognition-plus would only require volition in this case 
because there are no significant consequences that need to be understood and 
contemplated, with or without a decision-making support system. 
The two tests will diverge when sexual contact has significant physical or 
nonphysical consequences. Here, a person who can show volition to engage in 
sexual contact will automatically achieve legal capacity with the nature of the 
conduct test. Whether she does so with the cognition-plus test depends on 
whether she has the ability to contemplate the sexual decision on her own or 
can do so with the help of an adequate decision-making support system. The 
nature of the conduct test would thus permit a far wider range of sexual 
conduct, without concern for whether the person consenting could contemplate 
the consequences of the action, alone or assisted. People with severe and 
persistent cognitive impairments who act without a network are far more 
vulnerable to negative welfare threats under a nature of the conduct test as 
opposed to under the cognition-plus test. 
                                                                                                                     
 195 See Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 91 (2014) (“A ‘sex-
positive’ approach that values sexual pleasure in itself requires lawmakers and legal 
scholars to undertake a more honest assessment of what we choose to regulate, what we 
fail to regulate, and our justifications for these choices.”). 
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The nature and consequences test focuses on mental capacity. It converges 
with the cognition-plus test in situations when a person with cognitive 
impairments can still understand and process the sexual decision’s 
consequences, either because the impairments are not so severe, or because the 
consequences are not so complex. It diverges in cases of people with persistent 
cognitive impairments who do not have the mental capacities on their own to 
process a sexual decision. The cognition-plus test would allow those who fall 
into this situation to experience sexual expression if they have an adequate 
decision-making support system in place. In other words, the nature and 
consequences test would impose complete bans on sexual expression for many 
individuals with persistent cognitive impairments, whereas the cognition-plus 
would allow a route to a sexual life, provided adequate safeguards in the form 
of a supported decision-making network exist. 
The contextual approach focuses on all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the sexual act. It converges with the cognition-plus test in that it 
considers more than just the mental capacities of the subject and does not 
permit blanket prohibitions on sexual conduct just because of cognitive 
impairment. It diverges in the amount of contextual information that is 
considered to be relevant and in the amount of normative guidance that is 
provided in assessing the information in a given case. The contextual approach 
is openly normative and could examine the nature of the sexual relationship 
and even possibly the nature of the sexual acts involved. In contrast, the 
cognition-plus test keeps a narrow focus on the quality of the decision-making 
machinery, inclusive of the individual’s mental capacities and decisional 
network. Facts that might trigger moral evaluation only enter the analysis to 
the extent that they are relevant to some other step of the test. In sum, the 
contextual approach considers too much, running the risk of inhibiting sexual 
capability among populations whose sexuality is already societally disfavored, 
whereas the cognition-plus test removes such judgments from the purview of 
the judge. 
The cognition-plus test represents an improvement on existing sexual 
incapacity doctrines for people with persistent cognitive impairments. It strikes 
the correct balance between protection and restriction, has a sound theoretical 
basis, guards against courts dictating which sexual acts are appropriate, and 
provides more predictability to institutions in formulating resident sexual 
policies and practices. 
3. Limitations 
Despite its significant advantages, the cognition-plus test does have some 
limitations. The first limitation is one that is confronted by any sexual 
incapacity doctrine, which is the fact that the cognition-plus test will not be 
able to prevent all sexual assault or exploitation of those with cognitive 
impairments. Justice Holmes’s “bad man” will find a way around any sexual 
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incapacity test that we might construct.196 Thus, the question is not whether all 
sexual danger has been avoided, as that is impossible. It is whether we have 
found the best practical ways to reduce its prevalence, taking into account the 
costs of doing so in the form of restricting sexual opportunities.197 Current 
doctrines have failed to reduce sexual violence completely, and they have 
come at the great cost of creating restrictive sexual environments for people 
with persistent incapacities. 
Much of the discussion in this Article has centered on finding ways for 
people with persistent cognitive impairments to achieve sexual lives, but it is 
important to note that liability will still flow to sexual partners or institutions 
in situations with which many might be concerned. Liability will flow when 
the subject is incapable of expressing volition.198 Unlike situations of 
temporary transient incapacity, the court can examine whether such a 
volitional capacity was present at the time of the sexual encounter because the 
conditions causing the incapacity are more stable. Liability will flow when she 
is unaided by a supportive network and cannot understand the nature and 
consequences of the sexual decision or that there is a choice to be made. Thus, 
perpetrators who prey on isolated people with cognitive impairments have no 
legal recourse. Liability will flow when she cannot understand the nature and 
consequences of the sexual decision and her supportive network is inadequate. 
If perpetrators are part of a supportive network themselves, which might 
unfortunately be the case in many instances, they face a presumption of 
network inadequacy they must overcome to avoid liability. Together, these 
cover a wide range of the problematic situations of abuse and exploitation that 
are reachable by the law, at much lower cost to the sexual lives of people with 
persistent cognitive impairments. Of course, the prosecution of such claims 
will still be plagued by evidentiary problems, problems of non-enforcement of 
sexual assault law, and the like, but these are problems common to all 
doctrines in this space.199 
Second, even if everyone had adequate supportive networks in place, the 
cognition-plus test alone cannot and will not force decision-making networks 
to be supportive of sexual expression. While local decision-making networks 
may be superior to removed judges in understanding the sexual context of 
                                                                                                                     
 196 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). 
 197 See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2001) (arguing that legal feminism has problematically 
reduced discussions of sexuality to either dependency or danger). 
 198 While this is technically separate from the sexual incapacity doctrine, if the law 
were to incorporate an affirmative consent standard, and there are good arguments that it 
should, liability will flow if she does not affirmatively consent in a way that is appropriate 
to her forms of communication. See generally Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist 
Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989) (arguing for an affirmative consent standard). 
 199 See Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 221, 221–22 (describing the difficulties the criminal law has with successfully 
preventing sexual assault). 
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people with disabilities, they may in fact hold some of the same societal biases 
that historically plague judges in implementing incapacity doctrines.200 
Members of these networks may prevent sexual expression before it can 
happen due to stereotypes they might hold about people with disabilities. Since 
sexual incapacity doctrines only apply in situations in which sexual activity 
has taken place, they will not be able to ameliorate these types of situations. 
This reveals the limits of the law in this area, and perhaps generally. Without 
more intrusive sexual regulation of all local decision-making behavior, which 
would be undesirable for other reasons, the best that can be hoped for is that 
doctrines allow those networks that wish to facilitate the sexuality of people 
with persistent cognitive impairments the ability to do so. A less stigmatizing 
set of laws in this area might be able to exert positive expressive pressure on 
social norms around the sexuality of people with disabilities in the long run as 
well. 
Finally, the cognition-plus test represents only a partial solution to 
realizing the sexual capabilities of people with persistent cognitive 
impairments. The law is only one of many disabling features of the social 
environment.201 In addition to the biased attitudes already noted, many people 
with persistent cognitive impairments might not be embedded in an adequate 
supportive network in the first place, whether due to social isolation, lack of 
funding for long-term care facilities and staff, or overburdened caregivers.202 
Thus, changing the legal test for sexual incapacity is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for realizing the sexual capability of people with 
persistent cognitive impairments. It needs to be part of a multi-pronged 
approach that includes pursuing litigation in related areas, allocating more 
resources to these issues, and pursuing policy and regulatory reforms.203 
                                                                                                                     
 200 See Julian C. Hughes et al., Sexuality in Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
DEMENTIA 227, 229 (Charles Foster et al. eds., 2014) (noting family member discomfort 
with their relatives with dementia having sexual intercourse and staff discomfort with 
same-sex sexual expression in residential facilities). 
 201 See TOM SHAKESPEARE ET AL., THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD 
DESIRES 16–43 (1996) (discussing the various barriers to being sexual among people with 
disabilities). 
 202 See MARGARET C. JASPER, HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW 86 (2d ed. 2008) (“More than 
one-half of American nursing homes are below the suggested minimum staffing level for 
nurse’s aides, and more than one-third of nursing homes fell below the suggested minimum 
staffing level registered nurses. Of total licensed staff, nearly one-fourth of all nursing 
homes routinely fall below the suggested minimum staffing level.”); John V. Jacobi, 
Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2003) 
(calling for action on the isolation of people with mental disabilities); Richard L. Kaplan, 
Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 407, 409 (2007) (discussing the problems in the funding of long-term care); Donna R. 
Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement: An Overview from the Perspective of Residents 
and Their Families, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 11 (2005) (noting the problem of understaffing in 
long-term facilities). 
 203 See DOUGLAS WORNELL, SEXUALITY AND DEMENTIA 159 (2014) (noting how sex 
workers may have a role to play in addressing the sexual needs of older adults with 
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With the principles and mechanics of the test in place, and an 
understanding of how it differs from other approaches and has its limits, the 
next Part explores its application in more detail to the population of older 
adults with cognitive impairments. Specifically, it applies the cognition-plus 
test to the case of Henry and Donna Rayhons, a context of persistent acquired 
incapacity in the form of dementia. 
B. Application to Older Adults with Dementia 
The opening narrative of Henry and Donna Rayhons is an example of the 
situation of many older adults with cognitive impairments, but it is not the 
only one.204 It reveals some key points about the context of persistent acquired 
incapacity, particularly with older adults. First, as a demographic matter, 
dementia is rising in importance due to the aging of the population. Over 5 
million people currently suffer from dementia in the United States, most of 
them over the age of 65.205 By 2050, it is estimated that over 13 million people 
will have Alzheimer’s Disease, the most common cause of dementia.206 This 
condition causes deficits in communication, attention, reasoning, and 
judgment.207 The disease’s hallmark, however, is its effect on memory.208 It 
worsens both semantic memory, which relates to general knowledge, and 
                                                                                                                     
dementia); David F. Bragg, Dealing with Nursing Home Neglect: The Need for Private 
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24 (1999) (discussing the need to fund ombudsmen to safeguard the autonomy of 
individuals in long-term care facilities); Marshall B. Kapp, Nursing Home Restraints and 
Legal Liability: Merging the Standard of Care and Industry Practice, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 
16 (1992) (discussing policy and litigation responses to the improper use of restraints by 
nursing homes). 
 204 See, e.g., Marie-Therese Connolly, When the Mind Falters, Is Sex a Choice?, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/09/18/AR2009091801144_pf.html [http://perma.cc/SS2W-BBHN] (collected 
stories); Melinda Henneberger, An Affair to Remember, SLATE (June 10, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/family/2008/06/%20an_affair_to_remember.html [http:// 
perma.cc/P7KR-5WCP] (telling the tragic story of a ninety-five-year-old man and eighty-
two-year-old woman who found romance in an assisted living facility and then were 
separated by staff and a family member of the man). 
 205 See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2014 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 10 
ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA e47, e54 (2014). 
 206 See Hebert et al., supra note 22, at 1120. 
 207 See Peter V. Rabins, Dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease: An Overview, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 451, 452 (2001). 
 208 See Andrea Schaffner, Understanding Dementia, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 372, 
373 (2010) (“Memory deficit is one of the hallmarks of dementia.”). 
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episodic memory, which deals more with autobiographical knowledge.209 
Typically, dementias progressively worsen over time, though in the short term 
they may include fluctuating levels of capacity.210 
Second, sexuality does not disappear with age, even very old age.211 The 
form of sex, however, may change from being more genital in nature to taking 
on other forms of intimacy.212 Sexuality may even take on greater importance 
for people with degenerative cognitive conditions such as Alzheimer’s 
Disease, as it can help provide a sense of connection to other people. This is 
particularly important for people who lose social relationships as they age, 
especially if they enter institutions.213 Alzheimer’s Disease may also cause 
disinhibition in sexual behaviors, leading people with the condition to seek out 
sex more than they did in the past.214 
Third, many people with these conditions live in the context of 
institutions.215 These institutions are not generally sex-positive, as staff either 
                                                                                                                     
 209 See Taylor Kuhn & Russell M. Bauer, Episodic and Semantic Memory Disorders, 
in HANDBOOK ON THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF AGING AND DEMENTIA 401, 402 (Lisa D. 
Ravin & Heather L. Katzen eds., 2013). 
 210 See ALAN JACQUES & GRAHAM A. JACKSON, UNDERSTANDING DEMENTIA 53–65 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 211 See Stacy Tessler Lindau et al., A Study of Sexuality and Health Among Older 
Adults in the United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 762 (2007) (noting that fifty-three 
percent of those aged sixty-five to seventy-four and twenty-six percent of those seventy-
five to eighty-five were still having sex); see also Alexander Warso, Something Catchy: 
Nursing Home Liability in the Senior Sexually Transmitted Disease Epidemic, 22 ELDER 
L.J. 491, 500–01 (2014) (discussing the problem of sexually transmitted diseases among 
older adults). 
 212 See Ramzi R. Hajjar & Hosam K. Kamel, Sex and the Nursing Home, 19 CLINICS 
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 213 See Steven H. Miles & Kara Parker, Sexuality in the Nursing Home: Iatrogenic 
Loneliness, 1999 GENERATIONS 36, 37 (describing iatrogenic loneliness); Sally M. Roach, 
Sexual Behaviour of Nursing Home Residents: Staff Perceptions and Responses, 48 J. 
ADVANCED NURSING 371, 378 (2004) (“Sexual sensations are among the last of the 
pleasure-giving biological processes to deteriorate, and are an enduring source of 
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Sex, Intimacy, and the Aging Process, 18 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 185 (1990))). 
 214 See Leslie M. Lothstein et al., Risk Management and Treatment of Sexual 
Disinhibition in Geriatric Patients, 61 CONN. MED. 609, 609 (1997) (noting the 
phenomenon and discussing treatment options for such behaviors). But see Antonette M. 
Zeiss, An Observational Study of Sexual Behavior in Demented Male Patients, 51A J. 
GERONTOLOGY M325, M329 (1996) (concluding that sexual disinhibition is less frequent 
than assumed). 
 215 See Andrew Casta-Kaufteil, The Old & the Restless: Mediating Rights to Intimacy 
for Nursing Home Residents with Cognitive Impairments, 8 J. MED. & L. 69, 70 (2004) 
(“Alzheimer’s disease is responsible for half of the nursing home residencies in this 
Country.” (citing LAWRENCE FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR 
DISABLED CLIENT: LEGAL, HEALTH CARE, FINANCIAL AND ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed. 
2003))); Hajjar & Kamel, supra note 212, at 575. 
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ignore resident sexuality or try to actively prevent it due to biases against older 
adult sexuality or fear of legal liability.216 Nursing homes are frequently 
targets for lawsuits, and permitting sexual contact with a resident who cannot 
consent opens another font of potential liability.217 Perhaps in recognition that 
resident sexuality is something that cannot be swept under the rug anymore, 
the American Medical Directors Association recently called on nursing homes 
to formulate policies on the sexual behavior of residents, as only one in four 
nursing homes had one.218 
With that background on the importance and characteristics of the aging 
population with cognitive impairments, we now turn to how the cognition-plus 
test might apply to this group, using the Rayhons example. The first step in 
applying the cognition-plus test is to analyze whether there is volition. In the 
case of Donna, the criminal case against Henry rested not on some claim that 
Donna did not say yes, but that she could not say yes.219 Nonetheless, this first 
step may raise issues in similar contexts. First, the ways in which a person 
with persistent cognitive impairments communicates volition may vary 
significantly. For example, Henry described Donna as the one to initiate sex, 
and she would do so by saying “Shall we play a bit?”220 Assuming the 
accuracy of this statement, this is not something one would know without 
                                                                                                                     
 216 See Ann Christine Frankowski & Leanne J. Clark, Sexuality and Intimacy in 
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 218 See Bryan Gruley, Sex Among Seniors with Dementia Spurs Call for Policies, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/sex-
among-demented-spurs-group-to-call-for-policies [http://perma.cc/P74W-2G6R]. 
 219 In fact, in many cases of older adults in institutions seeking sexual pleasure, 
volition is not an issue, as they seek ways of expressing sexuality in the face of hostility 
from staff. See, e.g., Carole Archibald, Sexuality and Dementia: The Role Dementia Plays 
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 220 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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extensive knowledge of the person with the impairment. Second, whether or 
not there was volition could be an issue in another case. The well-documented 
evidentiary issues around expressed consent in non-incapacity sexual assault 
cases are also lurking in the background of incapacity cases.221 
The second step is to assess the mental capacities of the subject in light of 
the relevant consequences.222 Here, we do not know the exact mental faculties 
of Donna, but we do know she was cognitively impaired. To establish whether 
the cognitive abilities she had were sufficient for the sexual decisions she was 
making, we would need to know more about the types of sex in which Donna 
and Henry might have engaged. There are several reasons why the universe of 
consequences may be less complicated for Donna and Henry, though, and 
perhaps for many other similarly situated older adults with dementia. First, the 
pregnancy consequence will often not be present, as women have aged past the 
period of fertility.223 Less is known about male fertility, but it is commonly 
assumed to last longer, even if it might decline with age.224 Thus, older men 
who have access to fertile female partners may still have to deal with the 
potential consequences of pregnancy. Same-sex sexual expressions will never 
lead to pregnancy, exempting sexual contacts between members of the same 
anatomical sex from the pregnancy consequence altogether. Thus, typically 
older women, older men who have older women as sexual partners, and those 
who exclusively pursue same-sex partners need not have the capacity to 
consider this physical consequence, which may result in a lower level of 
required mental capacities to process the decision.225 
                                                                                                                     
 221 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, 
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427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam) (adopting a life course perspective by holding 
that distinctions based on age do not pose constitutional difficulties). The distinction drawn 
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Second, the impairment itself may affect what the relevant consequences 
are. If one cannot retain the psychological effects of sexual expression, the 
mental and social consequences are far less relevant for a given person. For 
example, someone who would experience negative feelings about engaging in 
sexual activities outside marriage, but who is not capable of remembering 
doing so, will not experience the negative psychological consequences of 
engaging in this activity.226 In this case, it is not necessary that the individual 
have the ability to process such a consequence in order to engage in that 
activity. In contrast, delirium creates short bursts of significant impairment 
followed by periods of lucidity. This situation should be treated similarly to 
other temporary impairments such as intoxication, as a less-impaired self will 
reemerge who will have to deal with the mental and social consequences of the 
sexual behavior. 
Third, as noted earlier, people with cognitive impairments may undertake 
various consequence-diminishing interventions, such as birth control or 
Truvada, to protect themselves from the negative consequences of sexual 
contact, with the assistance of a supportive network. These types of 
interventions will reduce the number of relevant consequences one needs to be 
able to process to have legal capacity. This, in turn, should reduce the required 
level of capacity. Of course, just because one can intervene does not mean one 
should. Requiring STD testing or safer sex practices of potential sexual 
partners are interventions that may not only reduce the sphere of privacy that 
an individual enjoys, but may also reduce the overall availability of sexual 
partners. This restriction of partner choice thus limits the sexual opportunities 
of people with cognitive impairments. The correct course of action in these 
circumstances would need to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, with as 
much input from the person with impairments as possible. 
Thus, for some in this population, the consequences of sexual expression 
will be fewer than if they had sexual relations at an earlier age without 
impairments and without consequence-diminishing interventions. For Donna, 
it is possible that she did not face a wide variety of relevant consequences 
because of her age, condition, and context, and she might thus satisfy the 
second step of this test. If this was not the case, then the third step of assessing 
the decisional support system comes into play. 
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Donna was in the fortunate situation of having many individuals who 
provided care for her, including her husband Henry, her daughters, and nursing 
home staff. These individuals varied in their assessments of her mental 
capacity to have sex. The daughters did not believe she had capacity, and a 
relatively cursory medical examination of her cognitive capacities led a doctor 
at the nursing home to agree. Henry Rayhons clearly had a different opinion. 
Ideally, all those individuals and institutions that surrounded Donna would 
have acted together to try to respect and facilitate Donna’s sexual desires.227 
This, however, did not happen. In applying the legal test, a court need not 
decide which part of the supportive network should “win out.” It need only 
assess the decision-making support network that is at issue in a particular 
sexual decision. 
In this case, the only individual who was facilitating Donna’s sexual 
activity was Henry, and thus he is the supportive network that must be 
evaluated for its adequacy. Because Henry is in a conflicted position by virtue 
of being Donna’s alleged sexual partner, there is a rebuttable presumption that 
Henry, as the supportive network, is inadequate. In assessing whether he can 
overcome this presumption, one must evaluate the evidence of his loyalty and 
care. On the axis of loyalty, we might look to Donna and Henry’s relationship 
for evidence of whether he acted in her interests, apart from his conflicted 
position with respect to sex. We know that they were married, which indicates 
that at least at some level Donna trusted Henry as a partner. Delving deeper 
into what we know of Donna and Henry’s relationship, it appears that it was a 
mutually supportive and loving, including after her diagnosis. 
On the axis of care, a court would examine Henry’s competence to act as a 
supportive network. This includes whether he had knowledge of Donna’s 
history, preferences, and forms of communication, which he likely did based 
on his close relationship with her. Also important is whether he created a safe 
space for the sexual activity to take place, reducing the risk of objective 
welfare threats derived from sex. While pregnancy is not a concern, sexually 
transmitted disease may have been depending on Henry’s health status. A 
further concern might have been the quality of the physical space in which 
they might have had sex, as risk of falling is a primary concern for older adults 
due to the risk of hip fractures.228 
Although it might be helpful to know a little more in order to fully assess 
whether Henry Rayhons could overcome the presumption of network 
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inadequacy created by his sexual conflict of interest, it appears that there is 
significant evidence that he was acting as an adequate support network for 
Donna. If this was indeed the case, then Donna would be deemed to have legal 
capacity under the third step of the cognition-plus test, if she had not already 
passed it under the second step. More importantly, perhaps, the prosecution 
might not have pressed charges for a relatively weak case, basing it solely on 
the mental capacities of Donna, as required by current law. 
    
The relative position of older adults with cognitive impairments is 
improved through the adoption of a cognition-plus test. Provided that there is 
volition, some of these individuals may satisfy the test simply because several 
of the consequences of sexual expression may not be present in this 
population, reducing the level of cognitive capacities needed to process the 
sexual decision. Age removes the possibility of pregnancy for many in this 
group, and sexually transmitted diseases can be screened by caregivers. Some 
of the mental and social consequences of sex may also not register due to the 
memory impairments that are characteristic of dementia. Others may satisfy 
the test despite exposure to these consequences due to the presence of a 
supportive network of family members or nursing home staff, provided that 
they adequately actualize individual sexual desires in a safe environment. This 
helps to make it easier for institutions to deal with legal liability, moving from 
an exposure avoidance strategy of risk management to a loss prevention or loss 
reduction framework. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both sexuality and incapacity are inescapable features of the human 
condition. They need not be mutually exclusive, but current sexual incapacity 
doctrines make them so for many, by creating unduly restrictive sexual 
environments and contributing to pernicious social norms. This Article has 
offered a way forward by reconfiguring sexual incapacity doctrines so that 
they are not a disabling force for people with persistent cognitive impairments. 
First, it has offered a novel theoretical basis for the doctrine—sexual 
capability—which accounts for the internal as well as external threats to self-
determination. Second, it has proposed a new legal test—cognition-plus—
which is grounded in the lived experiences of people with persistent cognitive 
impairments. This approach strikes the correct balance between protection and 
restriction, has a sound theoretical basis, guards against courts dictating which 
sexual acts are appropriate, and provides more predictability to institutions in 
formulating resident sexual policies and practices. 
  

